The Manuel of Epictetus: James Sanford's 1567 Translation
The first English translation of the Enchiridion of Epictetus: James Sanford’s The Manuel of Epictetus (1567), rendered “out of Greeke into French, and now into English, conferred with two Latine translations,” with Sanford’s own annotations and the apothegms of Epictetus.
Two reading editions are offered below — use the buttons to switch between them. Sanford’s marginal notes appear as numbered footnotes in both; his “Annotations” follow the chapters they gloss.
The Manuel of Epictetus
Original spelling (1567). James Sanford’s orthography is preserved verbatim. The printer’s superscript abbreviations — yᵉ (the), yᵘ (thou), yᵗ (that), wᵗ (with) — are retained as written. Sanford’s marginal notes are gathered as numbered footnotes; his “Annotations” follow the chapters they gloss.
Cap. 1. What things are in man, and what are not.
OF al things which are,1 some are in vs, some are not. In vs are Opinion, Endeuor, Desire, Eschuing, & briefly al that which is our worke. In vs are not our Body, Possessions, Honours, Souerainties,2 and summarily al that which is not our worke. Then the things which are in vs are frée and franke by nature, and can not be prohibited, empeached, nor taken away. But such things as are not in vs, bée seruile, féeble, and may be prohibited, empeched and taken away, as things vnto other men belonging, and not ours.
Cap. 2. Of the domage which proceedeth of taking the one for the other, and of the profit in good Iudgement.
IF the thinges which are franke and frée, thou shalte estéeme and Iudge seruill, and the thinges which are not oures, thou thynke proper, thou shalt be sorrowfull, thou shalte be troubled, thou shalt finde thy selfe encombred, & shalte miscontente thy selfe with God and men. But if thou thinke onely the things thyne, which truely are thine, and the things other mennes, which truely are other mens, no man wyll constrayne thée, no man wyll hinder thée, thou shalt blame no body, thou shalt accuse no body, thou shalt do nothing againste thy wyll, no man shall hurte thée, and moreouer thou shalte haue no enimy. For in nothing which is hurtefull thou canst not be perswaded.3
Cap. 3. That other mens matters must be omitted, our owne must be seene vnto, and that we can not do both.
THen if thou desire such things, remember that thou oughteste not beyng greatly mooued and troubled, to take them in hand: but eyther altogether thou oughteste to reiecte them,4 or for a tyme laye thē a side, and before al things to be carefull ouer thy selfe. But if thou desire these things, that is to rule, to be rich, to haue thine to prosper, peraduenture thou shalte not aspire to all these things,5 bicause thou doest desire also the chefest. So by no maner of means thou art able to attain vnto yᵉ things which giue felicitie & libertie to man.
Annotations
All these things) That is rule, riches. &c. bicause thou doest desire the chiefest) that is, these things which Philosophie giueth, Libertie, tranquillitie of the mynde, and securitie.
Cap. 4. Howe we oughte to behaue oure selues in euery sharpe imagination.
IN any strong and sharpe Imagination,6 thou must accustome thy selfe immediatly to consider, that this is nothing else but Imagination, and that in déede it is not as thou déemest. Afterward search it out, and examine it, with these rules whiche thou haste.
First and principally by this, whether the thing concerne the things whiche are in vs, or the things which are not. And if it be of the things whiche are not in vs, haue incontinently thys in remembrance: That belongeth nothing to me.
Cap. 5. What thing it is that one ought to desire, & one ought to flee.
CAll to remembraunce,7 that the promise and the end of desire is, enioying of the thyng desired: and that the promise and ende of eschewing is not to fall into that, whiche one oughte to flée: He then which cōmeth not to enioy, but is depriued of the promise of his desire, is not happy, but vnfortunate, and whoso falleth on yᵉ, which he declineth, is miserable. If thē onely thou decline that which is not agreable to the nature of the things whiche are in vs, thou shalt neuer chaunce into that, whiche thou shalt flee. But if thou thinkest to erempt thy selfe from sickenesse death or frō pouertie, or altogether shunne them, thou shalt finde thy selfe vnhappy.8 Wherfore thou must set apart all the eschuing, and auoiding of suche things as are not in vs, and transpose these into them which are against the nature of things, whiche be in vs. As touching desire, thou must altogether set it aside at this present. For if thou couet the things which are not in our power, it must néedes be, that thou be frustrate. Howe and after what sorte thou must desire the things which are in vs, thou art yet vncertaine. As for endeuoure and refraining of yᵉ minde vse it sleightly with reason, and a rested deliberation.
Annotations
Promise of desire, It is a certain faining of desire speaking with a mā. To the vnlearned sort the wordes should be more plaine▪ if he had thus spoken: when thou doest desire any thing, haue a cōfidence to obtaine it, & to haue thy desire. &c that which is not agreable to ye nature of the things which are in vs, Against these things verely do repugne, false opinion, naughtie & corrupt appetite, all the perturbatiōs of the minde, whiche the Stoicke Philosophers would haue to be in mans power: not so peraduenture that they appeare not (for that were more beseming God than man) but that they obeye reason. Trāspose these into them which ar against the nature of things which be in vs. These words seme vnto the vnlearned obscure, which had ben more lighter and easy, if he had written thus: To abhorre false opinions, folish and euil desires, dishonestie, and disworship. For as thou mayest flee these thinges, so thou mayest eschewe them.
Cap. 6. Howe we oughte to esteme the thinges wherein we take pleasure, or which bryng vs profite.
IN euery thing, whiche doth eyther delite thée,9 or whiche are profitable vnto thée, or which thou louest, thou must diligently consider the qualitie, beginning at the least thyngs. If thou loue a pot, say in thys manner: I loue a pot, thesame beyng brokē, thou shalte not disquiete thy selfe, for thou diddest well knowe, that he was fragile and brittle. Likewise if thou loue thy sonne, or thy wyfe, saye that thou doest loue a man: if one or other chāce to dye thou shalt not be troubled, bicause thou dyddest consider well that he was mortall.
Annotations
If thou loue a pot, Albeit Epictet, as a dispiser of riches, bringeth forth examples of vyle thyngs, as of baynes, lactuce, and other of that sort: yet Simplicius hath a more apte worde: If thou hādell or tosse a pot: that is, a brittle thing that cānot abyde or suffer tossyng, or hitting against the walles, as glasse, wherof Publiā sayth, Fortune is as brittle as glasse, whiche when it shineth, it is broken. Peraduenture he alluded to Diogenes Tonne.
Cap. 7. How a man ought to take a matter in hand that we may be voide of perturbation, & first by meditation.
WHen yᵘ doest take any thing in hande,10 thou muste set before thy eyes yᵉ qualitie therof: as if thou wylt goe to the baines, cōsider with thy selfe diligētly all that which may happen, & what they do. Some cast water, some are driuen out of their places, some doe a thing to the rebuke of an other, and in the meane season other picke & steale. In doyng thys thou shalt more certainely and constantly bryng thy matter to passe, if finally thou saye I wyll bath my selfe, and obserue thy purpose vnto nature agréeable, and semblably in all things thou shalt not do amisse. For after this sort if any harme befall while thou arte in the baine, this saying shal be in a redinesse: I would not onely obserue this, but also would not swarue from my purpose whiche is agréeable vnto nature, whiche I shall not performe, if I take displeasauntly the things which happen and befall.
Cap. 8. Howe to put awaye our perturbations, thorowe the consideration of the nature of suche things, as trouble vs.
THe things do not trouble men, but the opinions whiche they conceyue of them, as for example: death is not terrible (thē it would haue so séemed to Socrates) but bicause the opinion of death is terrible,11 death semeth terrible. Then when we are brought in the briers, or be troubled, or that we do bewaile our owne state, let vs not blame others but our selues, that is to say our opinions.12
Annotations
Death is not terrible, If either the soule be extinguished with the body, or be trāsferred and caried into a better place. But if thou shalte be punished for thy offences, it is a daungerous matter, and a harde case, excepte thou be fensed with the buckler of true pietie.
Cap. 9. The reason and proufe of the former precept with an assignation of thre sorts of men.
THe vnlerned accuseth other in his owne propre faulte. He that begynneth to haue knowledge accuseth him selfe. The learned accuseth neither an other, neither him selfe.
Annotations
The vnlerned, That is he, which considereth not what things are his owne, and what ar an other mannes: who requireth all things to be done according to his wil and pleasure, that which neither may be done, neither perhappes ought not. Himself for he doth acknowledge hys faulte, and also is intentiue and diligente about it, leaste that he stumble againe at the same stone: that is, lest that he claime or attribute other mens right to himselfe.
Cap. 10. That the glory in exteriour and outwarde things is vayne.
GLory not in thy selfe for the excellencie of an other thing.13 It shoulde be tollerable, if a horse aduaunting himself should say: I am faire. But thou when in bosting thy selfe, thou doest say, I haue a faire horse: remember that thou dost glorifie thy selfe for the beautie which is in the horse.14 What haste thou then? Nothing bisides the vse of opinion.
Therefore when in the vse of opinion thou shalt gouerne thy selfe according to nature, then thou shalt haue wherwith to auaunte thy selfe, for in any commoditie which is thine, thou wilte glorifie thy selfe.
Annotations
The vse of opinion, This semeth obscure to the vnlearned. But it is euen as he should says In all things we ought not to follow appetite, or the common opinion, but the iudgement of reason. For to vse well opinion, is nothing else than to iudge well of all things, and to obey reason, not affection.
Cap. 11. What outwarde things are graunted vs, and howe we should vse them, by a similitude.
EVen as in Nauigation,15 when men make their abode at any hauen, if yᵉ Mariner goeth to lande for freshe water, and it hapneth that incidently by the way, he thinketh to gather cockles or oysters, yet neuerthelesse he ought to haue regard of the shippe, and oftentimes to looke back, whether yᵉ Master calleth: and if he call thée, leaue all behinde, and returne to the shippe, least that thou being bond like a beast, be not drawen by force to the shippe. Euen so it is, in the course of our life, as if for a cockle or an oister, there be gyuen vs a wife and a childe, or other things, which we holde deare, and wherin we take plesure, they ought not to put vs from our purpose vnto nature agréeable: But if the master do call, run vnto the shippe, leauing these things behinde, not looking backe towards them. But if thou be olde, go neuer farre from the ship, least that thou being called, do fail, & that thou be not constrained. For he which willingly followeth not necessitie, by force and maulgre his téeth she draweth him.
Annotations
Least yt thou being called dost fail. He speaketh not of the outwarde power, but of the imbecillitie and weaknesse of the might: which the greter it shalbe whē age cōmeth on vs with more few things the mind is to be occupied: for bicause it is very difficulte to be voide of these, and to fulfill that which Philosophie commandeth. A single person (if other things be correspondent) may be in his life time, cōtented with a little, and die with a more pacient minde. A wife, children, and familie, do more trouble and disquiete the husbande and father, being as well in good healthe, as sicke, than his life. I vnderstande the shippe, either to be Philosophie, or the trade of our life: the ruler and maister of the Shippe to be GOD: to whom when he calleth, who so obeyeth not either is entreted as a slaue, or else is vtterly forsaken.
Cap. 12. How we may enioy outward things without fault or trouble.
WIsh not that the thyng which is done,16 be done according to thy pleasure and will. But wish that it be done, euen as it is don, and thou shalt be happie. Sicknesse is an impedimēt of the body, not of thy purpose, except thou wilt thy selfe.17 Halting is an impediment of the legge or foote, and not of thy purpose, and so consider in euerie inconuenience whiche may befall, and thou shalte finde the impediment to appertaine to an other, and not to thée.
Annotations
Halting is an impediment of ye foote, not of thy purpose. But thou wilt say whē thou art purposed to goe a iourney (namely if thou want a horse, or a waggon) halting hindereth thee. Epictet wil answer & say: If thou shalt follow my precepts, thou shalt begyn no iourney, whiche thou art not hable to atchieue. So the more and greater the impedimentes of the body shall be, so much the more thou shalt suppresse appetite, and shalte take fewer things in hande. But thou dost say, that this is the impediment of purpose, and therefore very troublesome. Epictet denieth it to be an impediment, to desire nothing rashly and in vaine: but affirmeth it to be the propre part & office of a Philosopher. Verily, euen a foole doth vnderstande this, that it is better to make appetite obey reason, than to burne in vaine desires. The impediment to appertaine to another and not to thée) If he would graūt the foote to be a part of the body, (neither doeth he denie it) & the bodie to be part of man (which he seemeth to denie) when his foote is poistered & shakled, the bodie is also cūbred, the body being cumbred, mā hym selfe at least wise partely is cumbred, but if the body be the instrument of man, doutlesse it cā not be denied, but that the instrument being mutilate and vnperfect, the worke shalbe more vnperfect and vnmeete. For thou shalt haue the ouerthrowe, if thy Sworde or Dagger lacke hiltes and handle.
Cap. 13. Of the remedies which we haue against all accidentes.
IN euery accident thou must incontinently consider what puissaunce & strēgth thou hast to withstand that whiche is hapned.18 If any mischiefe befall vnto thée, thou shalt finde vertue whiche is good and holsome, as against voluptuousnesse, continencie. If laboure be offred thée, thou shalte finde strength: if wrong, pacience: and if thou shalt thus accustome thy selfe, thou shalt neuer be troubled with ymaginations.
Annotations
Thou shalt not be troubled with imaginations) That is, thou shalt neuer be ouercome and subdued with pleasure and sorrowe, but shalt conquere naughtie desires, and affections, by the helpe of wisedome and vertue.
Cap. 14. What maner of men we oughte to shewe oure selues, when we lose outwarde worldly goodes.
NEuer say that thou haste loste any thing,19 but that thou haste restored it. If thy sonne die, he is restored. Thy liuelode is taken away, hast thou not restored it? But he which depriued thée of it, is an yll man. What matter maketh it to thée, by whome he which gaue it, hath eftsoones taken it? Haue a care and regarde to all things, keping and vsing them (during the time only that thou haste them in thy custodie) as things vnto other men belongyng, euen as the wayfaring man dothe to his lodging.
Cap. 15. That a man ought not to lose the quietnesse of mynde, for exteriour and worldly things.
IF thou wilt profite thy self,20 let passe these cogitations. If I shall not be carefull of my affaires, I shall not haue wherwith to liue. If I correct not my seruāt, he will be naught. For it is farre better to famish without sorowe and feare, than to liue in abundance with a troubled minde. And it is much better, that the seruant shoulde bée faultie, than thou whiche art his maister vnhappy. Then thou must begin with the least things, the Oyle is spilte, the Wine is stolne. Consider with thy selfe, that quietnesse and securitie of the mind cost thée so much: for nothing is fréely gotten. If thou call thy seruant, imagine it may so fal out, that he heareth thée not, or hearing thée, to doe nothing whiche thou wouldest haue him do. But that he is not worth so much, that for him thou shouldst be troubled.
Annotations
It is far better to famish. &c. It may be asked not without a cause whether so greate constancie may agree with mans nature, that it may suffer and endure extreme hunger?
Cap. 16. That for the estimation of the people we ought not abandon vertue.
IF thou wilte profit thy selfe, be not displeased, if for outwarde things, thou seme to other madde or folish.21
Annotations
If thou wilt profit That is to say in Philosophy and garnishing of the mind. For he vnderstandeth and meaneth that progressiō, wherby the tranquillitie and libertie of the minde is increased. Be not displeased, if for. &c. For who so regardeth not pleasures, riches, & honor, namely if he may obtaine them: of all men he is accompted a foole, namely in these dayes. But in times past diuers Philosophers and good mē for the loue they had to vertue abandoned al worldly wealth and promotions, as Crates, Diogenes, and thys our Epictete.
Cap. 17. Against vaine glory.
SEke not to séeme learned and experte in any thing,22 and if to any thou doest seme, trust not thy self: for thou knowest it is not easy for a man to kepe hys purpose agreable vnto nature, and to embrace exteriour things, but it must néedes be, that he which is careful of one, should be negligent in the other.
Cap. 18. What things we oughte to desire, & what we ought not.
IF thou wilt haue thy wife,23 thy children, and thy frends to liue for euer, thou art a foole. For thou wilt haue in thy power the things whiche are not, & wilt haue yᵉ things to be thine, which are belonging to other mē. And so if thou wilt not haue thy seruaunte to offende, thou art a foole, for yᵘ wilte haue vice to be no vice. But if thou wilt not be frustrate of that whiche thou doest desire, this thou maiest do: herein then exercise thy selfe.
Annotations
For thou wilt haue vice to be no vice, He meaneth (as I suppose) that boyes and al maner of men, by nature are inclined to vice: and that vices cannot be repelled, but by philosophie which yong and tender age is not able to receyue.
Cap. 19. What things make vs bonde, and what free.
HE is Master and Lord of any man,24 to whome (nil he will he) he maye either giue or take awaye. He then which will be frée, let him neither desire, nor flée any thing, which is in an other man hys hande, and power, otherwise of necessitie he shal be constrained to serue.
Annotations
He is Master of any man. &c. How many Maisters then hath Fortune layed vpon vs? Howe many more do we laye vpon vs, thorowe the insaciable desire of transitorie thinges?
Cap. 20. A rule to electe and choose things present▪ past, and to come, by a similitude.
REmēber that thou muste make comparison of thy lyfe to a banket:25 where if the meate stande before thée, thou muste take it modestlie: if he, whiche doth bring it, doe passe by thée, staye hym not, or if he be not yet come to thée, be not ouer gredy thereof: but stay vntill he come to thée. In like manner thou must dispose thy self, towards thy children, towards thy wyfe, towards greate men, and towards riches, so at length thou shalt be worthie the table of yᵉ Godds. But if thou take not that which is set before thée, but doest refuse it: then thou shalt not only be worthy of their table, but to be their companion: for when Diogenes, and Heraclitus and other like to them did thus, worthily, and of very good righte they were diuine, and so were accompted.
Annotations
Worthy the table of the Goddes) He signifieth, that the despising of outwarde & worldly things is a certaine heauenly thing, & that it maketh a man like to God. They wer diuine, & so were accompted. Arrogantly doubtlesse, and ignorantelye. For howe farre doth euen the excellentest man that euer was differ from the least part of the Godhead?
Cap. 21. By what meanes we muste gouerne oure Imagination about such things, as seme to be eschewed.
WHen thou doest sée any man sorrowful,26 and torment hym self either bicause he hath no tidings of his son, either bicause he is dead, either bicause he hath spent all, beware enter not into imaginatiō, that this maketh him vnhappy: but haue redilie in remembraunce that it is not the accident, which troubleth him (seing it tormenteth not an other) but his opinion conceyued therof. But if thou fall in talke with him, accommodate thy self to his perturbation, and moreouer if the matter so require, wéepe also with him for companie: but take héede that thou sorrowe not inwardlie.
Cap. 22. That it lieth not in vs to choose the state of our life, but to vse it euen as it chaunceth, by a very apte similitude.
THou must remember that thou arte one of the players in an enterlude,27 and must plaie yᵉ parte, which the authour thereof shall appoint, thou must play be it lōg, be it shorte. If he appointe thée to play the begger, yᵉ Creple, yᵉ Prince, or the priuate person, do it well and wittilie, for it lieth in thée to play that part, whervnto thou art appointed, and in an other to choose and appoint thée.
Annotations
Which the authors therof shall appoint, That is, whether he be a comicall, or a tragical Poet? As concerning the very mater the Greeke Epigram doth declare.
Which may thus be englished: What is our life? a gawish game a sweete delighting play. Then cares in gaming lay a side, or liue a miser aye.
Nazianzenus doeth almost signifie the same, but with a more grauitie and pietie, in these verses worthy to be had in remembraunce.
Which may after this sorte be Englished.
Cap. 23. By what meanes we ought to gouerne our Imagination, in looking for diuers things.
IF thou take the croking of a crow to be vnluckie,28 lette not that imagination moue thée, but iudge immediatly in thy self, and say: That portendeth nothyng to me, but eyther to my body, or to my possession, or to my estimation, or to my wyfe, or to my children: but as touchyng my selfe, they signifie nothing but good, at least wise if I will: for what so euer shall chaunce, it lieth in mée to haue the profite and commoditie of it, if I will.
Annotations
If thou take the croking. &c. We haue in stede of diuination by flying and crying of birdes Astrologie: Which if by yerely reuolutions & progressions of the starres, it threatten damages and dangers, let vs not vse Epictet his counsell, but godly prayers.
Cap. 24. Howe to be vnconquerable, being the cause of the former precepte, and as it were the conclusion.
THou mayest bée inuincible,29 if thou neuer enter into battaile, for thou art vncertain, whether it lye in thée or no, to haue the the victorie.
Annotations
Thou mayest bée vnconquerable. This saying dependeth vppon the diuision of things made in the beginning. They are conquered, which couet other mens goodes, that is, suche as belong to the body, and are placed in fortunes hande. They conquere, whiche resiste naughtie opinious and desires, so that they contende according to the lawe.
Cap. 25. Which is the readiest way to vertue.
TAke héede that in following thy imaginatiō thou say at no time,30 the man is happie, whom thou doest sée auaunced eyther to honour, or authoritie, or renoumed: for if the substance of goodnesse be in the things, which are subiecte to vs, there nether enuie, nor emulatiō taketh any place. Then thy purpose is not to be Emperour,31 or King, but frée, & frāke. But vnto that thing there is but one certaine waye, that is, the contempte of such things as are not in vs.
Annotations
For if the substaūce of goodnesse. &c. The vnderstanding of this sentence is vttered stoicallie in darke wordes. He which seeketh all good things of himselfe, is of a quiet mind: who so is of a quiet minde, he doeth neither enuie, nor emulate. For seing that lack of paine called in Latin Indolentia excludeth all perturbations:32 verely it excludeth enuie and emulation. But if these affections do rule in any: it is manifestlie gathered thereof, that he is farre from the tranquilitie of the minde, and doth not obey the preceptes of Philosophie.
Cap. 26. A solution of them which seme to let the things before mentioned, & how a man should not be angrie.
REmember,33 that he, which taunteth or beateth, is not yᵉ author of reproch, but the opinion conceiued of yᵉ same as reprocheful. Then when any doeth kindle thée to wrath, vnderstande that thou art moued to anger thorow thine opinion. Wherefore especiallie endeuoure thy selfe,34 that imaginations plucke not cōsente from thée, for if thou shalte once suppresse it for a certaine time, thou shalt more easilie be thy own Miaster.
Cap. 27. How to learne, and set our minde in highe thinges.
SEt before thy eyes, deathe, banishment, and all things which séeme terrible, but especially death: in so doing, thou shalt not thinke vpō base and vile things, and shalte neuer be excéeding couetous.
Annotations
And shalt neuer be exceding couetous. Syracides affirmeth,35 that the imagination of death, and God his iudgemente doth feare vs frō sinne. Which if it do: we are taught to suffer aduersitie much more paciently, & to despise prosperitie, bicause of their sorrow and profit, which endureth for a little space.36 So Cicero. All pleasure sayth he is to be estemed as nothing, which when it is paste, it is as if there had ben none at all. But in great griefe of the bodie and anguish of the minde, one houre seemeth longer than a whole yeare.
Cap. 28. The seconde part, wherein he doeth pointe him out which hath already profited. And doth first dissolue such things, as come in vre to the students of Philosophie.
AS soone as thou haste determined to leade a perfect lyfe,37 prepare and addresse thy self to be scorned and mocked of many, and to heare what they speake of thée, wherof commeth this sodain sagenesse and grauitie? whereof commeth this sadnesse? laye aparte thy sadde sowre countenance. But yet reteine & kepe these things which séeme best to thée, in such sorte, as if this were the front where God hath ordained and placed thée to fight.38 And if thou persist in the same things, they whiche before haue mocked thée, will haue thée in admiration: but if like one fléeing awaye, thou gyue ouer thy enterprise, thou shalte be double as much mocked and scorned.
Annotations
Lay apart thy sad sowre coūtenāce. That is, a musing countenance, sad grauitie and hautinesse of minde. And it appeareth by this shorte and quicke sentence of Menander,39 that this was the countenance of Philosophers. They which loke stately, say, that Solitarinesse is mete for meditation.
Cap. 29. That bosting destroyeth the state of a Philosopher, in shewyng wherevnto he oughte to leane.
IF it chaunce at any time, that thou giue thy self to the things which are not in vs, and that thou dost desire to please any man, vnderstand that at the same present thou art fallen frō thy state.40 Wherefore in all things let this suffise thée, to bée a Philosopher: But if thou dost couet to séeme to any a Philosopher, let it be to thy self, and that shall be sufficient.
Annotations
If it chaunce at any tyme that thou giue thy self. &c. He forbiddeth the desire of glorie, & seeking for ostentation, which affectiō it will be long before it take place in good and learned men. He woulde haue a Philosopher to kepe him self within the limittes of his conscience, as an oyster within his shell, and to iudge that, the most noble shew of his vertue. Thou art fallen from thy state, That is to saye, thou arte vanquished.
Cap. 30. How to aunswere to such stayes as woulde hinder a man from wisedome.
LEtte not these cogitations torment thée,41 I shall not be in honor nor in place, where I shall be regarded: for if to bée without honour is an ill thing, thou canst not be in euill for an other thing, no more than in a dishonest thing. Is it in thée to beare rule, or to be bidden to a banket? No. What is this then, but to be without honour? and howe sayest thou, that thou shalte not be estemed, whom it behoueth to to medle in those things onely which are in our power, in which thou mayst beare a great sway and stroke. But thou wilt say I can not profit my friends. What doest thou call to profite?42 shall they haue no mony of thée? neither wilt thou make them citizens of Rome? But who told thée that these things be in vs, & other mens workes? Who can gyue to an other that he himself hath not? Get it, (say they) that we may haue it, also. If I may get it,43 kéeping my selfe modest, faithful, and valiant, shew me the way, and I will get it. If ye thinke it méete, that I should lose my goods, that you should get such thinges as are not good, sée your selues haue vnreasonable and vngratefull you are? But if thou preferre a faithfull and sincere friende before money, herein help me, and thinke it not méete that I shoulde doe the things whereby I should loose modestie and fidelitie: But I can not succoure nor ayde my coūtrey.44 What doest thou call succoure & aide? That it shall not haue of thée, nor by thy meanes, faire & sumptuous buildings, nor baines? What then? hath it not shooes by the Shoemaker and Armour by the Armorer? It is sufficient when euery vocation doth his work. If thou get it a faithfull and modest member, doest thou thinke, that thou bringest it but a little profit? very great doubtlesse. In so doing thou arte not vnprofitable to it. In what state shall I be in my coūtry? in that thou maist, keping alwayes fidelitie and modestie. But if supposing to aide it thou loose modesty and fidelitie, what profit shalt thou do to it, which arte become impudent and disloyall.
Annotations
Thou canst not be in euil for an other thing, This sentence dependeth vpon the opinion of the stoicks, that only honesty is good, & onely vice is naught. The contempt and despising of me, if I do my duety, is not my vice, therfore neither my euill, but theyr vice and euyll who of a peruerse iudgement & naughty mind do contemne, dispise, and misuse mee without cause. Shewe mée the way, He signifieth that ryches and dignitie is gotten by nothyng else but by deceit, and for that cause a good man ought to despise them. Neither doth he speake of them, which shewe themselues vnworthy of honoure, and they are the cause, that they are not regarded. A faithfull and sincere friend, Nowe a daies most men had leiffer to haue money. Neither do they thinke that a poore friend may help vs in any thing. So are endowed maidens preferred before them, who are chaste, and well brought vp, if perhaps there be any suche, and doe so continue. Wherefore the wowers peraduenture are to be pardoned, who in so vncertayne a hazarde of chastitie, & honestie, had rather to abyde the vnquietnesse of riche than of poore wiues. Neither hath it Shooes by the Shooemaker, nor Armour by the Armourer. The sence is: sumptuous buildings bains, and the citie of Rome is no more to be required of a Philosopher, than weapons of the Shooemaker, or Shooes of the Smyth: seyng that it is the duety of a Philosopher, to traine vp his countrey men in vertue, as it is the Shoemakers duetie to make Shooes, and the Smithes, Weapons.
Cap. 31. A continuation of the solution of suche things as do hinder him which doth beginne to studye philosophie and wisedome, in shewing that a man should not moue himselfe, for that which chaūceth to an other & that he hath nothing of an other without giuing of his owne.
IS there any placed before thée at a feast?45 or was reuerēce done to him before it was done to thée? or is he preferred before thée in coūsaile? If these things be good, thou must reioyce, that thy neighbour hath them: if they be ill: then be not sorrowfull, bicause they chāced not to thée. Then remember in giuing thy minde to nothing else,46 but to the things which are in vs, thou canst not attaine to the like things, which other doe in them which are not in vs. Howe may it bée done, that a man frequentyng not thy house shall haue like thynges as hée whiche haunteth thy house, or he that seketh not friendship and fauoure, as he which doth? or he which doth not please and praise the, as he which doth please and praise thée? Thou shalte be vniust and vnsaciable if thou haue not payde for suche thinges as thou haste bought, but doest require to haue them for nothing. Admit the case I could not buye lectuce for a halfe penny,47 if any then buy a half peny worth of lectuce, and thou dost buy none: think not thy self in worsser case & to haue lesse then he, which hath bought lectuce: for as he hath bought so thou hast not giuen thy halfpenny. Euen so it fareth, thou art not bidden to a mans feast, because thou haste not giuen him asmuche as his feaste coste him. He selleth it for praise, he selleth it for seruice. Giue him then (if thou thinke it good) the pryce, for the whiche he solde it thée. But if thou wilte not performe that and take these things, thou arte vnsatiable and foolish. Hast thou giuen nothing in steade of the feast? Yes mary, for thou hast not praised him, whome thou wouldest, and haste not suffered him in his portly going.
Annotations
If these thinges be good, Bycause they are good, they are sorrowfull that they coulde not attaine to them: bicause they be euill, they are glad, that they are chaunced to other, And hast not suffered. &c. Pride and ambitious salutations of riche men do seeme to be vnderstoode in this place very troublous to a simple and learned man, in like maner salutations, retinues, praises. But perhaps rich men giuen to pleasures, going in their pompe, were wonte on euery side to leane and cleaue to Parasites.
Cap. 32. What thinges are common euen according to the will of nature.
THe purpose and will of nature,48 may be iudged by these things, in which we differ not one from an other: as for exaumple, if a mans seruaunt breake his Maisters cuppe or any other thing, incontinently it is saide this is a thing which oftētimes chaūceth: remember then when thine is broken, that thou be the same maner of man, as thou were when the other mans cuppe was broken. And so do in greater thyngs. If a mans child or wife chaunce to dye, there is no mā but will saye incontinently this is naturall. Notwithstanding euery man when any of his is dead, he doth lamēt and bewaile pitifully: But we muste remember how we are disposed, when we haue hearde any suche thing of others.
Cap. 33. Howe one ought to vnderstande the nature of yll.
EVen as the white whereat Archers shoote,49 is not set ther, wher it may not be stricken, so it is of the nature of ill in this worlde, for it is not set out to be embraced, but to be eschued: as if goodnesse were sette for the white, and euill were all that, wher the white were not, besides the white, the Archer hath an ample and large space to shoote frō the white: so without the onely marke of goodnesse on euery side is placed euil, which is as easy to be done and committed, as it is difficill to hitte the white, or to doe good.
Cap. 34. We ought not abandon our minde to wrath for iniuries done: and how to take in hand our enterprises.
IF any deliuer thy body to the firste he meteth, it wil greue thée excedingly: but when thou doest yelde thy minde to the first that commeth, as when thou arte wronged, thy mynde is troubled and heauy, arte not thou ashamed?50 Before thou take any thing in hande, consider first the beginning, and the sequele, & then take it in hand. If thou do not so thou shalte neuer be certaine and sure in thy enterprises, not regarding that which may befall, but after when any dishonest thinges chaunce, thou shalte be ashamed.
Annotations
If any deliuer thy bodie to the first he meteth, He argueth from a lesse thing to a more, after this sort: thou wilt be angrie with them, which gaue power to any to violate thy bodie (such is the condition of them whiche are banished) how much more oughtest thou to be angrie with thy selfe, whiche art wont to giue power to euerie man to hurte thy minde, wheras it lieth in thee not to be hurt of any man at all?
Cap. 35. An effectuall example to consider what may befall in euerie thing which we shall take in hande.
WIlt thou cōquere at yᵉ playes Olimpia?51 And I by yᵉ faith of my bodie: for it is a verie honourable thing, but consider wel the beginning, and the sequele and then take the matter in hande. Thou must order well thy selfe, & vse necessarie meats, abstaine frō delicate and daintie things, and exercising thy selfe, according as it is expediente for the time and houre appointed, be it hote or colde, not drinking water or wine, if occasiō so require. And briefly thou must commit thy selfe whollie to the chiefe of the games as to the Phisicion in doing that whiche he shal appoint thée. Afterward enter into fight, and sometime to haue thy hand hurt, thy foote out of ioynte, to swallowe downe much dust, to receiue gréeuous strokes, and otherwhile after all this to be vanquished. When thou haste considered all these things, if thou be willing, go and fight, otherwyse thou shalt be like the little boyes which are now wrastlers, nowe swordplayers, nowe trumpetters, forthwith players in tragedies. So thou also now a fighter, now a swordplayer, afterward an Oratour, at length a Philosopher: but throughly nothing at al, but as an Ape thou doest counterfait and resemble al things, and nowe one thing shall lyke thée, now an other: for thou hast not done thy enterprise aduisedly, in foreséeyng the circumstances, but aduenturouslie following a lighte and colde desire. So the greater number, when they sée a Philosopher, or when they heare say that Socrates speaketh wel, (but who can speake so well as he?) they will incontinentlie dispute and reason of Philosophie, and searche the causes and nature of things. Man first consider the thing, & the qualitie therof, and then enterprise it.52 Afterwarde trie whether thy nature be able to endure that whiche may happen. Wilte thou be a wrastler? behold thy armes, thy thighes, and thy loines: For nature mother of all things, hath framed euery man to some particular thing. Doest thou thinke that endeuouring thy selfe about these things yᵘ mayest liue as thou hast bene accustomed? As to drinke so much as thou wer wont, to be angrie so muche as thou were wont? Thou must be vigilante, thou must trauell, thou muste set aside thy proper affaires, thou muste be mocked of boyes, dispised of all the world, and in all things to haue leste authoritie, be it in honoure, in office, or in iudgement, and in all other affaires.53 Then consider al these things, and loke whether in their stéede, thou haddest leiuer to haue rest and libertie, without any perturbation. But if thou haddest not leiuer to haue it, sée that thou take not in hande many things, to the ende that (as I haue tolde thée) like little boyes, thou be not now a philosopher, now a lawyer, afterward an aduocate lastlie the Proctor of Cesar. All which things knitte in one, can in no wise agree: for it must néedes be that thou be either a good or an ill man, that thou addict thy selfe to interiour or exteriour thinges: that thou possesse the place of a Philosopher and well aduised man, or of a Foole and Ideote.
Annotations
At the playes Olympia. Olympia were playes as running, wrestling, and suche other faictes of actiuitie accustomablie kepte in the honour of Iupiter Olympicus, at Pisa & Helides Cities in Greece. Man firste consider, He signifieth as to wrastling, to leaping and rūning, al are not meete, so neither to Philosophie, both haue neede of pacience of bodie & minde. Of which things, whoso is destitute, he shal be rather a counterfayt then a very wrastler & Philosopher. Thou must be mocked of little boyes,) Verely Philosophers were wonte of al men to be dispised, but great stoute champions were in admiration.
Cap. 36. That dueties do arise of nature, and that they are considered howe a man shoulde behaue him selfe towardes any man, nexte of the dueties towards men.
DVtie is measured by mutual affections.54 If thou haue a father, thou must regarde and honoure him: giue place to him in all things, and if he chide or beate thée, indure it. He is a naughtie father thou wilt say. Nature hath enioyned vs the obedience of the father without mention of good. Arte thou not ioyned by nature with a good father? No, but with a father. Wherfore do thy dutie towards him, and consider not what he doth: but do such things, whereby thou maiest kepe thy purpose agreable to nature. No man will hurte thée excepte thou wilte. Thou shalte be then hurted, when thou shalte thinke thy selfe hurt. So thou shalt do the dutie of neyghbour to neyghbour, of Citizen to Citizen, of lord to lord, if thou accustome thy selfe to consider the mutuall affections.
Annotations
By mutuall affections. Affections are vsed as a certaine rule to measure dueties by.
Cap. 37. What our dueties are towards GOD, and how to behaue vs in his doings.
THe principall point of honoring God, is to thinke well of him, to beleue that he is, that he hath created all things, and that well and iustly he gouerneth them:55 afterward to obey him, accepting al things that he doth, as procéeding of a very good intent. In so doing, thou shalte not blaspheme God, neither shalt thou accuse him of negligence. Thou arte not able to do this, otherwise, excepte thou withdraw thy self frō the things which are not in vs, and placing good and ill in them which are in vs. But if thou estéeme any of the things, which are not in vs, to be good or ill, thou must of necessity, when thou doest not attaine to that whiche thou wouldest, or when thou doest fal into that which thou doest shunne, blame and hate the cause of such an accidēt which is good. All liuing creatures haue this by nature,56 that they flée and eschewe suche things, and séeme vnto them noysome, and their causes: but contrarywise they search, & maruell at these things which séeme to bring profite, and the causes of them. He then which thinketh himselfe hurte, can take no delite in that which vnto him séemeth hurtefull. So it is impossible that a man hurte may reioyce. And hereof it commeth to passe that the son doth checke the father, when the father maketh him not partaker of the things, which séeme good vnto him. This is that, which made discorde betwene Polinix and Eteocles, bycause they estéemed rule good. For this cause the husbandman, for this cause the Mariner, for this cause the Marchant, for this cause they which loose their wife and childrē do oftentimes defile and detest God, for wheras vtilitie is,57 there is also pietie. Wherfore he that doth endeuor to desire and flée that, euen as he ought, by the same meanes he obserueth and kéepeth pietie.58 As touching offerings and oblations let euery man doe them according to the guise of his countrey: purely, without superfluitie, according to his abilitie, without negligence or nigardshippe.
Annotations
Whereas vtilitie is, there is pietie, O wonderfull sentence, and also wicked to see to: but so applied that it vncouereth the dissimulation of mans minde, and can scarce be nothing more agreeable to religion. Guise of his countrey. Forasmuche as pietie consisteth in the mind, he thinketh that we should not much regarde ceremonies. Which if it mighte be perswaded to some men which are in these dayes, we should liue more quietlie. It mighte be perswaded, if we woulde rather endeuoure to lyue according to religion, than to dispute of religiō: if we were rather desirers of the veritie than of vanitie, that is, of ambition, of emulation, of couetousnesse, of reuengemente, and of suche like confusions and destructions of the minde, if there be any other.
Cap. 38. What maner of man he ought to be that cōmeth to a Diuinour, and how to vse diuinations, wherin resteth our duetie towardes God, and towardes our selues.
IF thou desire and seke to knowe that which is to come of any thing,59 first thou must vnderstande yᵗ thou art ignoraunt of that shal come, and therefore thou doest goe to the Diuinour to knowe it of hym. Notwithstanding if thou be wise thou arte not ignoraunt what it is, nor the qualitie therof. For if it be among the number of the thinges whiche are not in vs, truelie it is necessarie, that it be neither good nor ill. Remoue then from thée (if thou go to the Diuinour) al desire & eschuing other thou shalte come to him trembling and quakyng. But when thou shalt vnderstande, whatsoeuer shall befall to appertain nothing to thée, and of thée not to be passed vpō thou mayest vse it well, and no man shall forbid thée. Therfore goe & aske counsaile of God, as of him who can giue thée very good, and after he hath giuen thée counsaile, remember whō thou hast called to counsaile, & whose counsaile thou hast despised. Coūsaile may be demaunded of the Diuinour (as Socrates sayeth) for such things, whose consideration is referred to the end, the knowledge of which ende, occasion cannot be giuen by any maner of meanes, nor any arte. And therfore thou must not aske counsaile of the Diuinour, whether thou shalt put thy life in daunger for thy country, or for thy friend, if nede require, for if he perceiue any vnluckie signe, it is altogether manifest, that it signifieth death, or some impedimente of thy bodie, or banishment: but reason telleth & perswadeth thée, that thou muste put thy selfe in daunger for Countrey, or for thy friend whē néede requireth. Giue eare then to that which the great Diuine Apollo sayeth, who did chase out of his temple, the man, which helped not his frend being in daunger of death.
Annotations
Remember whome thou hast called to counsaile, It must needes be, that the cunning of the diuinours, southsayers, was in diuination very great. Otherwise a man of so greate grauitie woulde not haue accompted their prophecies, for diuine aunswers.
Cap. 39. Dueties towards our selues, & firste of such as tende to the constancie of maners, and what thinges let it, and chiefly of talke and silence.
THou must prescribe a rule and fashion,60 which from hence forth thou shalte obserue when thou art alone and when thou art in companie. Let silence be kept for the most part: or let necessarie things be talked of, and thesame in fewe words. But if the time require thée to speake,61 speake: but not of all thinges, not of the combate betwene fensers, not of rūning with horses, not of wrastlers, not of meates & drinkes triflingly, nor principally of men, in praising or blaming them, or comparing them with others. And if thou be able, chaūge thy familiars Communication into that which is honest and comelie. But if thou be enuironed with straungers, holde thy peace.
Annotations
Enuironed with straungers, He vnderstandeth those men, whome bicause of their estimation and authoritie he dareth not admonishe.
Cap. 40. Of laughing.
LAughe not muche,62 nor at all communication, neither a loude.
Cap. 41. Of Othes.
SWere not,63 neither make an othe if it be possible for thée. But if thou canst not otherwise do, do it when it shall be nedefull.
Cap. 42. What conuersation may do.
FRequent not the bankets and familiaritie of the cōmon sort,64 and straungers. But if occasion so require, be mindeful and take héede that thou become not one of the common sort. And vnderstande thou that he which wrestleth with the defiled, must néedes be defiled also.
Cap. 43. Of the vse of suche things as belong to the bodie.
AS touching the body, take such things as shal be to his vse and also be profitable for the mind, as meate, drinke, apparell, harbour. But as touching daintie and delicate dishes, thou must altogether reiect them, and banishe them from thée.
Cap. 44. Of the acte of Nature.
TOuching Venerie we ought as muche as is possible, to leade a chast life before mariage. But if we be cōstrained, we must take nothing but that which is lawful: not withstanding reproue them not which vse it, in blaming them, and auaūting thy selfe abroade, that thou doest not vse it.
Annotations
In blaming them. Christian charitie commaundeth that sinners should be reproued, and obstinate persons to be eschued.
Cap. 45. Against anger, and what manner of men we should shewe our selues towards backebiters.
IF any bring thée worde,65 such a man misreporteth and backebiteth thée. Excuse not that which he hath said, but make this aunswere: he is ignoraunt of many other great faults, and imperfections which are in me, otherwise, he woulde not onely haue sayd this.
Cap. 46. How to behaue our selues in shewes and triumphes.
IT is not requisite to frequent often the shewes and turnaments.66 But if at any time occasion requireth, sée that thou séeme not to fauoure any man more than thy selfe, that is, wilt thou onely haue that done whiche is done: and him only to conquer, which conquereth? For so thou shalte not be empeched. Abstaine thy self altogether frō shouting, frō consenting countenaunce, and let not thy gesture be sad and graue, but somewhat merry. At thy returne from the shewes, talke not much of the thinges whiche haue ben there done or said, seing they auail nothing to thy amendement.
Cap. 47. Of the desire of suche as go to heare others communication.
APproch not néere them, whom thou séest to commen apart, and be not thou present if it be possible, or as seldome as thou mayest. But if thou be presente kepe in suche wise thy constancie, that thou shewe thy selfe voyde of all perturbations.
Cap. 48. When one hath to speake with a noble personage.
IF thou haue any thing to do especially with suche as are of noble blood,67 and great authoritie. Cōsider what Socrates or Zeno haue done herein, or the wisest man yᵗ euer thou diddest knowe, and so thou shalte not be in doubte, howe thou must behaue thy selfe.
Annotations
What Socrates or Zeno, That may be gathered out of bothe their sayinges and doings, forasmuch as we haue not any thing written of neither of them. But vnlesse thou shalt be endewed with the learning and constancie of them both foolish imitatiō will turne thee to shame. And perhappes they obserued not euery where a seemelinesse and grace.
Cap. 49. How we ought to prepare our selues, when we goe to speake with a man of honoure.
WHen thou wilt go to such a man as is of greate honoure,68 presuppose in thy minde, what may chaunce, that (possibly) thou shalt not be receiued, that thou shalte be shutte oute of doores, that the gate shall not be opened, or that he will not regarde thée. Afterwarde ponder with thy selfe, if with all these thyngs, it bée expedient for thée to go to him: and when thou shalte come before him, suffer and endure that which shalbe done, and saye not to thy selfe: I deserue not to be thus entreated: for it is to common a thing to reproue and blame the thinges which are not in vs.
Cap. 50. When we meete with many men, how to frame our communication.
IN company speake not ouermuche, nor beyonde measure, of thy déedes, neither of thy daungers: for it can not so much contente other to heare them as thy selfe to reherse them.69 Sée also that thou moue no laughter by thy communication, for that (I wote not how) engendreth disdaine, and also causeth that no reuerence is giuen to thée by them which are present. And very often leadeth thy communication to filthy and dishonest talke:70 But if it befall, and that the matter and time require it, reproue him that shall vse such ribauldrie and filthynesse. If not, at the least shewe and declare by silence and shamefastnesse, that suche communication doth displease thée.
Cap. 51. Howe to resist pleasure.
IF thou cōceyue any pleasure in thy minde,71 be circumspecte (euen as in other things) that shée beguile thée not, but examine the matter, & take space to deliberate on it. Afterwarde consider both the times, that is to say, the time wherin thou dost enioy pleasure, and the time wherein after the enioying of it thou mayste repent thée for hauing enioyed it. And afterwarde reproue thy self, and consider how wel at ease and contented thou shalte bée, if thou abstaine thy selfe, and in so doing thou doest commende thy selfe. But yf the matter séeme to require thée to doe▪ it, beware that hir flatteries, hir swéetenesse, and hir inticements ouercome thée not, but consider how farre better it shall be, if thou be able to winne the victorie of that conflicte.
Cap. 52. That we oughte not to leaue off our good purpose, what soeuer men say.
WHen thou arte resolued to do any thing,72 and hast not yet done it, refuse not to be séene in doing therof, although other may iudge amisse thereof, for if thou do euill, thou muste geue ouer thy worke: if thou do wel, feare them not who wrongfully, and without cause shall reproue thée.
Cap. 53. Of the honestie that we ought to keepe at the table.
WHo hath said:73 it is daye, and it is night, taking the proposition seuerally we ought to agrée, but to vnderstande it together, it is not to be receyued. So at the table to choose for our selues the greatest, & the best parte of the meate, is a greate commoditie towardes the bodye, but it is against the honest participation that we ought to haue at the table. Then if at any time thou be bidden to a banket,74 remēber that thou muste not onely haue regarde to the meate, for the profite of thy body: but also to honestie, and to behaue thy self at the table, as thou oughtest.
Annotations
Wheras before he compared our life to a feast, let this precept be applied to all the parts of our life: and euery where let there not be a respecte to our priuate desire and vtilitie, but of equitie & societie, & let the will of the feaster, that is God, be considered.
Cap. 54. That we should not vndertake more than we are able to do.
IF thou haue taken more in hande,75 than thou arte able to atchieue or bring to passe: thou shalt not bring it to effect, and also hast omitted that which thou were able to performe.
Cap. 55. That we ought to be circumspect aswell to saue the minde harmelesse, as the body.
EVen as in going thou doest take héede that thou steppe not vppon a nayle,76 or that thou wreaste not thy foote: so in leading thy life take héede, that thou hurte not thy minde, the gouernesse of all thy doinges, which if we obserue in al things, we shall without daunger take them in hande.
Cap. 56. Of the possession of suche things as belong to the body.
THe bodie is to euery man the forme of riches,77 as the foote is of the shooe. If then in thys thou perseuer, thou shalte kepe the meane: if thou excede, thou must néeds as it were, fall downe headlong: as if thou be more curious about the fashiō of the shooe, then is nedeful for yᵉ foote, thou wilt make him of golde, after of purple, laste of all set with studdes of gold: for there is no end of that thing which hath once passed measure.
Cap. 56. For maydens vnmaried.
WOmen after.xiiij. yeares of age are called of louers Ladies:78 for after this age men (to the end to company with them) endeuoure wholly to please them. To obtaine then mennes good will afterwarde they become very curious in trimming and decking themselues. Wherfore they muste be admonished, that for no other cause we esteme them, but bicause they are modest, wise and honest, bearing reuerence and obedience to their husbandes.
Cap. 57. That more care is to be had of the mynde than of the bodie.
TO persiste and continewe in things which belong to the bodie,79 for pleasures sake, as in much exercise, in muche trimming, & adorning of the bodie, is signe of an abiecte minde, and verie muche swaruing from nature, and also it is a signe of consenting to superfluitie: for we embrace pleasure, and reioyce in things which we allowe. We must thinke then the excéeding care of the bodie to be frō the purpose: but principallie we muste be carefull of that whereof the bodie is but the instrument, that is, the minde.
Cap. 58. A precept to learne pacience and meekenesse.
WHen any hath misused thée either in word or déede, remember that he doth suppose it to be done and saide according to his dutie. Wherfore it is impossible for him to followe thy aduise and counsaile, but his own. But if he iudge amisse, he is hurt whiche is deceyued. For if any do iudge hidden truthe to be a lye, the truthe hydden is not hurte, but he which shal be deceyued. If so be then thou be perswaded, thou shalt shewe thy selfe gentle and paciente towards him that hath iniuried thée. And at euerie thing thou shalt say, it hath so pleased him.
Annotations
He doth suppose it to be done according to his dutie. Pletho putteth vs in mind of the same,80 that also we shoulde be blamed, which are able to perswade one thing, and can not induce others into our opinion. But thou wilt say, oftentimes vnreasonable and slaunderous men know that such things as they do are dishonest and shamefull for them to do. Epictetus maketh aunswere: they ar so much the more worse & miserable: but thou art neuer the more worse and miserable. But their dishonestie is to me a damage, bicause they hurte my estimation, bicause they diminish my substāce, bicause they doe afflict my body by violence or witchcraft, bicause they hinder my cōmodities? Epictet wil make aunswere, that these are none of thine, but other mens, and to appertaine nothing to thee. Wherof much is spoken of before. The hidden truth, As it is in Sophocles in Electra, Orestes was not therfore dead, bicause he had perswaded himselfe to bring his bones shutte in a coffin to Egisthus and others.
Cap. 59. That all things partely do agree the one with the other, and partly do disagree.
EVery thing hath.tj. handels, one whereby it may be carried,81 the other whereby it may not. If thy brother be yll condicioned, take him not by that whereby he is yll condicioned, for it is the handle whereby he cannot be carried, but take him by that, whereby he is thy brother, and whereby he is nourished with thée, in so doing thou shalt take him by yᵉ handle, whereby he ought to be carried.
Cap. 60. That bicause of knoweledge, or hauing more than other, we cannot inferre that we are better.
THese words agrée not together I am richer than thou,82 therfore better. I am wiser & better learned than thou art, therfore I am better: but these agrée farre better. I am richer than thou art, then my possession is better than thine. I am wiser and better learned than thou arte, my words then are better than thine, but thou art neither thy possession nor yet thy communication.
Annotations
But thou art neither. &c. Thou wylte say, yea: but bicause of riches, eloquence, and power, I am much regarded. The same doth Epictet reproue, who thinketh good onely wisedome and vertue to be much set by. What man except he were a very naughtie and wicked flatterer,83 hath had Nero the Emperour in greate estimation, although besides his ryches and Empire, he were eloquent, a Poet, and a Musician? The minde of a perfect man abhorreth to allow those, whose folishnesse and dishonestie is knowen, in what fashion soeuer honour for a shewe be giuen to them, bicause of the giftes of fortune, and corrupte conuersation.
Cap. 61. Of an exact iudgement in things.
IF any washe himselfe spéedily, saye not that hée washeth himself naughtily,84 but spedily. If any drinke much, say not that he drinketh naughtily, but muche, for if thou knowe not why he doth it, howe doest thou know that he doth naughtily? So it shall chaunce that we doe receyue and supporte the fantasies and imaginations of some, and to other we agrée.
Cap. 62. Against glorie and ostentation. And first as touching knowledge.
REpute not thy selfe a Philosopher in any case:85 nether dispute not much of precepts, but rather put some thing in execution, as at the table, teach not how one should eate his meate, but eate as it behoueth thée.86 For remember that Socrates did so set aside all ostentation. But if at any time these precepts come in question, speake as little as is possible, for it is daungerous to vomite that which the stomacke hath not well digested. And if it chaunce, that a man tell thée, that thou knowest nothing, and that it moueth thée not,87 vnderstande that this is a great entraunce of thy worke, for the shéepe vomiting vp their grasse, declare not to yᵉ Shepherds how muche they haue eatē, but digesting it within they shewe wᵗout their fine wooll and milke. Thou therfore shewe not, neither vtter thy learning to yᵉ rude and ignoraūt: but declare some effects outwardly of that being well digested.
Cap. 63. Against the boasting of sobrietie and sufferaunce.
GLory not thy selfe to haue mortified,88 empaired, and weakened thy body thorough abstinence: Neither if thou haste dronken nothing but water, saye not at euery occasion, I drinke nothing but water. But consider how much more abstinēt the poore are, who craue almes, suffering and enduring muche more than thou. Furthermore consider howe many perfections and vertues thou haste not, which other haue. But if thou wilt exercise thy self in paine and pacience, do it by thy self, and séeke not to aduertise other of it, as they do who suffring wrong of great men, sette images on fire, & say, we are vndone, to the end to moue & assemble the people. For a bragger is altogether mindefull of worldely things, and turneth topsie turuie the goodnesse of paciēce and abstinence, bicause he determineth the ende of them is to haue, the good opinion and prayse of many.
Cap. 64. The description of a triple qualitie or propertie, that is, of the vnlearned, of the Philosopher, and of him that beginneth to learne.
THe condicion and state of the vnlearned is, to looke for of hym selfe neither profite nor damage, but of outwarde thyngs. The state and condicion of the philosopher is, to looke for of himselfe all vtilitie and discommoditie. The signe of him which beginneth to profite is,89 that he dispraise no man, that he praise no mā, that he cōplaine of no man, yᵗ he accuse no mā, that he speake nothing of himself, as though he were any body, or knewe any thing. When he shal be at any tyme empeched or disturbed, he blameth none but himselfe. And if one commende him, he mocketh him couertly which cōmendeth him, if he be dispraised, he purgeth nor iustifieth himself: but liueth like a sicke person fearing to moue & troble any thing within him before he be recouered. He setteth apart all appetite, and fléeth the thinges which are againste the nature of them whiche are in vs. He vseth a light endeuour aboute all things, and passeth not whether he be tearmed a Foole or an Ideote. And (in briefe) he watcheth himselfe, as his Enimie and Spye.
Annotations
That he dyspraise no man, That is through curiositie and too much diligence in other mens matters, or prouoked thoroughe selfe loue: Epitecte commendeth Agrippinus, but why? that other shoulde follow his example. He reproueth other, wherefore? that they shoulde be amended.
Cap. 65. That learning is not only to be expounded but also to liue according as it doth prescribe.
IF any do auaunte that he can well interprete and expounde the sentences of Chrisippus,90 say with thy self, if Chrisippus had not writtē darkly, & obscurely, I should haue nothing wherewith to auaunte my selfe. But Chrisippus hath not written, to the ende he would be interpreted, but to the end that according to his doctrine we should liue. If then I vse his preceptes, then shall I attaine to yᵉ goodnesse of them. But if I maruell at the interpretation, or if I can well interprete it my selfe, I maruel at the Grāmarian, not at the Philosopher, or else play the Grāmarian not the Philosopher. But what auaileth it to haue founde written remedies, to vnderstande them well, and being sicke thy selfe not to vse them?
Cap. 66. That we ought to perseuer in goodnesse.
THou must be stable and firme in thy good purpose and deliberation of life,91 euē as in a law. Perseuer therfore, euē as if in trāsgressing, thou shouldest incurre the crime of impietie. And whatsoeuer mē talke of thée, regarde it not, for that belongeth not to thée.
Cap. 67. That we ought not to deferre from day to day, for to leade a perfect life.
HOw lōg yet wilt thou deferre to esteme thy selfe at any tyme worthy of these thinges which are so excellēt, and not to trāsgresse one? But if frō day to day thou dost deferre yᵉ time, thou dost not auāce but hinder thy selfe. Then incontinētly accustome thy selfe to liue as perfecte, and to vse well all accidents and chaunces. And in euery thing suppose that the combate is ready for thée, and neglecte no time, for that daye in the which thou doest not profit, thou doest receyue damage. After this manner Socrates became the wisest of al. But yf thou bée not yet Socrates, thou oughtest to liue as, one that would become Socrates.
Cap. 68. Three places in Philosophie, and the order of them together.
THe firste and moste necessarie place is that which appertaineth to the practise of knowledge:92 as, not to lye. The seconde whiche appertaineth to demonstrations: as, how commeth it to passe that this is demonstration? What demonstration is? what cōsequence is? what fighting is? what is true? what is false? Therefore yᵉ thirde place is necessarie for the seconde, the seconde for the first. The most necessarie of all, and wherein to rest our selues is the first. But we doe contrary, for we stay our selues in the thirde, and therein bestow all our studie, and make no accompt of the first, but are alltogether negligente. And how? For we make leasinges, and notwithstanding wée haue well néere alwayes no other thing in our mouthe, why and wherefore we oughte not to lye.
Annotations
Not to lye. And this is the actiue or morall part. We should not lye. This is called the iudiciall or naturall part. To demonstrations. This is logike and Rhetoricke, wherby we proue and trie the truthe, and disproue that which is false.
Cap. 69. Three sentences of the auncientes to be had in minde. Of the which the first is of Cleantes, the seconde of Euripides, the thirde of Plato.
LEt vs alwayes haue these thrée thinges in memorie and before [ 1] our eyes. The first is, Necessitie draweth all thinges (will we nill we) euē as God hath appointed, wherfore he which willingly followeth it, is [ 2] wise. The seconde is if I recoile and giue back, I shal be naughte, & spite of my téeth wéeping and wailing I must [ 3] néedes follow. But the third, O Crito If it so please god, so be it. Anitus trulie and Melitus may well kill me, but to hurte me, it lieth not in their power.
Annotations
It is maruell that this morall and auailable saying of Epictetus was omitted, [Greek] [Greek], that is, Beare and Forbeare, whiche be vsed very often, and doth in a manner comprehende al that whereof mencion is made at large in this boke.
Footnotes
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A diuision of things. ↩
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The natural condition of things. ↩
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The effects of a good and euill iudgement. ↩
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Our consideration is to be stirred vp and a diligēt preparation to be vsed. ↩
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One can not serue vertue and vanitie. ↩
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We must refrain our cōsent before the matter bee plainely perceiued. ↩
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A vain flight from discommodities maketh a man miserable, & a depriuing of desires maketh a man vnfortunate. ↩
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One newely entred in the doctrine of vertue ought not to take to much vpō him. ↩
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The nature of the thing derely loued is to be considered. ↩
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The circumstāces of euery businesse are to be considered. ↩
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A wise man is without complaint. ↩
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We are troubled with opinions, not with the things them selues. ↩
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We must auaunt in the riches of the minde, and not in the gifts of fortune. ↩
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The vse of opinion is propre vnto man. ↩
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We oughte in al things principally to be mindful of God. ↩
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We muste not couet in vaine, that which is impossible. ↩
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A wel framed mynde is disturbed with nothing. ↩
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The power of the mind ought to resist aduersity & naughty desires. ↩
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We do neuer lose our goods, but restore thē, to him of whom we receiued them, that is to God. ↩
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The garnishing of the minde is to be regarded aboue all things. ↩
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We muste take paciently the euill opinion of the multitude conceiued of vs. ↩
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It is hard to doe many things at once. ↩
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We do in vaine seke to kepe those things inuiolable, which are not in our power. ↩
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Who is a maister. ↩
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Such things as are offred are to be taken: suche things as are denied vs, are not to be desired. ↩
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We muste haue regard to humanitie in suche sort, that the quietnesse of minde be retained. ↩
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We muste passe the whole course and time of our life, according to Gods will. ↩
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A wyse man taketh profite by euery chaunce. ↩
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We muste take in hand things agreable to oure strength. ↩
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He that seketh for all good things of him selfe, he doth neither maruell at any mā, nor enuyeth any. ↩
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There is one way to libertie: the despising of outwarde things. ↩
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[Greek] [Greek] ↩
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No man is hurt, but of himselfe. ↩
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Delay establysheth iudgement. ↩
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Syracides. ↩
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Cicero. ↩
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A Philosopher ought not to regarde the mockery of the people. ↩
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Constancie getteth victorie. ↩
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Menāder ↩
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By this worde Philosopher is ment a wise man. ↩
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That a Philosopher euen of small substaunce, may muche profit the common wealth▪ by teaching of vertue & hys good example. ↩
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How a wise man aideth his friends. ↩
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We ought to require of euerye mā but such things as he maye and ought to performe. ↩
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How a wise mā helpeth his coūtrey. ↩
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We must enuie no man, and reioyce of an others good fortune. ↩
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A benefit cōmonly is giuen for pleasure and seruice. ↩
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Who so lacketh cōmoditie lacketh also cost and disquietnesse ↩
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We must not iudge otherwise of oure owne misfortune than of other mens. ↩
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It is in our choyse whether we wil be troubled with the opinion of yl things. ↩
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A premeditation and a diligent preparatiō putteth away ignomie and repentance. ↩
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Temeritie is the mother of lightnesse and inconstancie. ↩
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Bothe the thyng and our nature is to be considered and compared together. ↩
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Constancie is to be obserued. ↩
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We muste do our duetie towards all men, although other mē do not their duetie towards vs. ↩
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Their religion is nothing worth whiche do not place felicitie in the riches of the minde. ↩
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Tull. 1. Offic. ↩
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Where as vtilitie is, there is pietie. ↩
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He preferreth the rites of a coūtrey before the truthe. ↩
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The diuinour is not to be counseled of our duetie, but of the su••cesse of certaine actiōs ↩
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We must determin who and what maner of men wee will be. ↩
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We muste rule our tongue. ↩
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Laughter. ↩
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Othes. ↩
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Bankets. ↩
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An yl report is not to bee passed vpon. ↩
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Shewes are to be seene with a quiet minde. ↩
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In meetings, we must folow the examples of wise men. ↩
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The difficult comming to noble men is to be suffered. ↩
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Laughter is not to bee moued. ↩
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Ribauldrie is to be abhorred. ↩
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It is better to despise than to embrace pleasure. ↩
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Oure duetie oughte to moue vs, and not the communication of the people ↩
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We muste not haue regard to our owne luste but to the Communaltie. ↩
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In feastes modestie is to be obserued. ↩
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We ought to measure our strēgth in al things ↩
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We must endeuour to haue a perfect minde. ↩
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A few thinges are sufficient for nature, but infinite substance suffiseth not couetousnesse ↩
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Modestie in women is more to bee regarded, than theyr beautie. ↩
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We must be stow much time in garnishing of the minde, but a little in the body ↩
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Pletho. ↩
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The handle of humanitie and not of immanitie is to be taken. ↩
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We muste not triūph of the giftes of fortune, but of the riches of the minde. ↩
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Nero. ↩
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Not onely the deede it selfe, but the cause of the dede is to be considered. ↩
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Philosophie is not to be declared by words, but by deedes. ↩
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Nothyng must be spoken vnaduisedly. ↩
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The Sheepe declare by their wooll and milke how much they haue eaten. ↩
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Ostentation is to be eschued. ↩
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The signes of him whiche profiteth ↩
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They are Grāmarians not Philosophers, whiche doe expounde the preceptes of wise men, & follow them not. ↩
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Preceptes are to be obeied, and wordes are not to be regarded. ↩
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Precepts are better than the cause of preceptes, and the Methode of demonstratiōs. ↩
The Manual of Epictetus
A modern-spelling edition. James Sanford’s 1567 translation has been re-spelled throughout according to present-day orthography, and the printer’s superscript abbreviations (the, thou, that, with) have been expanded; but his vocabulary and grammar are left untouched, so the archaic forms — thou, thee, thy, thine, ye, doth, hath, shalt, and the -eth / -est endings — are all retained. Sanford’s marginal notes are gathered as numbered footnotes; his “Annotations” follow the chapters they gloss.
Cap. 1. What things are in man, and what are not.
Of all things which are,1 some are in us, some are not. In us are Opinion, Endeavour, Desire, Eschewing, and briefly all that which is our work. In us are not our Body, Possessions, Honours, Sovereignties,2 and summarily all that which is not our work. Then the things which are in us are free and frank by nature, and cannot be prohibited, impeached, nor taken away. But such things as are not in us, be servile, feeble, and may be prohibited, impeached and taken away, as things unto other men belonging, and not ours.
Cap. 2. Of the damage which proceedeth of taking the one for the other, and of the profit in good Judgement.
If the things which are frank and free, thou shalt esteem and judge servile, and the things which are not ours, thou think proper, thou shalt be sorrowful, thou shalt be troubled, thou shalt find thyself encumbered, and shalt miscontent thyself with God and men. But if thou think only the things thine, which truly are thine, and the things other men’s, which truly are other men’s, no man will constrain thee, no man will hinder thee, thou shalt blame nobody, thou shalt accuse nobody, thou shalt do nothing against thy will, no man shall hurt thee, and moreover thou shalt have no enemy. For in nothing which is hurtful thou canst not be persuaded.3
Cap. 3. That other men’s matters must be omitted, our own must be seen unto, and that we cannot do both.
Then if thou desire such things, remember that thou oughtest not, being greatly moved and troubled, to take them in hand: but either altogether thou oughtest to reject them,4 or for a time lay them aside, and before all things to be careful over thyself. But if thou desire these things, that is to rule, to be rich, to have thine to prosper, peradventure thou shalt not aspire to all these things,5 because thou dost desire also the chiefest. So by no manner of means thou art able to attain unto the things which give felicity and liberty to man.
Annotations
All these things) That is rule, riches, etc. because thou dost desire the chiefest) that is, these things which Philosophy giveth, Liberty, tranquillity of the mind, and security.
Cap. 4. How we ought to behave ourselves in every sharp imagination.
In any strong and sharp Imagination,6 thou must accustom thyself immediately to consider, that this is nothing else but Imagination, and that indeed it is not as thou deemest. Afterward search it out, and examine it, with these rules which thou hast.
First and principally by this, whether the thing concern the things which are in us, or the things which are not. And if it be of the things which are not in us, have incontinently this in remembrance: That belongeth nothing to me.
Cap. 5. What thing it is that one ought to desire, and one ought to flee.
Call to remembrance,7 that the promise and the end of desire is, enjoying of the thing desired: and that the promise and end of eschewing is not to fall into that, which one ought to flee: He then which cometh not to enjoy, but is deprived of the promise of his desire, is not happy, but unfortunate, and whoso falleth on that which he declineth, is miserable. If then only thou decline that which is not agreeable to the nature of the things which are in us, thou shalt never chance into that, which thou shalt flee. But if thou thinkest to exempt thyself from sickness, death, or from poverty, or altogether shun them, thou shalt find thyself unhappy.8 Wherefore thou must set apart all the eschewing, and avoiding of such things as are not in us, and transpose these into them which are against the nature of things, which be in us. As touching desire, thou must altogether set it aside at this present. For if thou covet the things which are not in our power, it must needs be, that thou be frustrate. How and after what sort thou must desire the things which are in us, thou art yet uncertain. As for endeavour and refraining of the mind, use it slightly with reason, and a rested deliberation.
Annotations
Promise of desire, It is a certain feigning of desire speaking with a man. To the unlearned sort the words should be more plain, if he had thus spoken: when thou dost desire any thing, have a confidence to obtain it, and to have thy desire, etc. that which is not agreeable to the nature of the things which are in us, Against these things verily do repugn, false opinion, naughty and corrupt appetite, all the perturbations of the mind, which the Stoic Philosophers would have to be in man’s power: not so peradventure that they appear not (for that were more beseeming God than man) but that they obey reason. Transpose these into them which are against the nature of things which be in us. These words seem unto the unlearned obscure, which had been more lighter and easy, if he had written thus: To abhor false opinions, foolish and evil desires, dishonesty, and disworship. For as thou mayest flee these things, so thou mayest eschew them.
Cap. 6. How we ought to esteem the things wherein we take pleasure, or which bring us profit.
In every thing, which doth either delight thee,9 or which are profitable unto thee, or which thou lovest, thou must diligently consider the quality, beginning at the least things. If thou love a pot, say in this manner: I love a pot, the same being broken, thou shalt not disquiet thyself, for thou didst well know, that he was fragile and brittle. Likewise if thou love thy son, or thy wife, say that thou dost love a man: if one or other chance to die thou shalt not be troubled, because thou didst consider well that he was mortal.
Annotations
If thou love a pot, Albeit Epictet, as a despiser of riches, bringeth forth examples of vile things, as of baths, lettuce, and other of that sort: yet Simplicius hath a more apt word: If thou handle or toss a pot: that is, a brittle thing that cannot abide or suffer tossing, or hitting against the walls, as glass, whereof Publian saith, Fortune is as brittle as glass, which when it shineth, it is broken. Peradventure he alluded to Diogenes’ Tun.
Cap. 7. How a man ought to take a matter in hand that we may be void of perturbation, and first by meditation.
When thou dost take any thing in hand,10 thou must set before thy eyes the quality thereof: as if thou wilt go to the baths, consider with thyself diligently all that which may happen, and what they do. Some cast water, some are driven out of their places, some do a thing to the rebuke of another, and in the mean season other pick and steal. In doing this thou shalt more certainly and constantly bring thy matter to pass, if finally thou say I will bathe myself, and observe thy purpose unto nature agreeable, and semblably in all things thou shalt not do amiss. For after this sort if any harm befall while thou art in the bath, this saying shall be in a readiness: I would not only observe this, but also would not swerve from my purpose which is agreeable unto nature, which I shall not perform, if I take displeasantly the things which happen and befall.
Cap. 8. How to put away our perturbations, through the consideration of the nature of such things, as trouble us.
The things do not trouble men, but the opinions which they conceive of them, as for example: death is not terrible (then it would have so seemed to Socrates) but because the opinion of death is terrible,11 death seemeth terrible. Then when we are brought in the briers, or be troubled, or that we do bewail our own state, let us not blame others but ourselves, that is to say our opinions.12
Annotations
Death is not terrible, If either the soul be extinguished with the body, or be transferred and carried into a better place. But if thou shalt be punished for thy offences, it is a dangerous matter, and a hard case, except thou be fenced with the buckler of true piety.
Cap. 9. The reason and proof of the former precept with an assignation of three sorts of men.
The unlearned accuseth other in his own proper fault. He that beginneth to have knowledge accuseth himself. The learned accuseth neither another, neither himself.
Annotations
The unlearned, That is he, which considereth not what things are his own, and what are another man’s: who requireth all things to be done according to his will and pleasure, that which neither may be done, neither perhaps ought not. Himself for he doth acknowledge his fault, and also is intentive and diligent about it, lest that he stumble again at the same stone: that is, lest that he claim or attribute other men’s right to himself.
Cap. 10. That the glory in exterior and outward things is vain.
Glory not in thyself for the excellency of another thing.13 It should be tolerable, if a horse advancing himself should say: I am fair. But thou when in boasting thyself, thou dost say, I have a fair horse: remember that thou dost glorify thyself for the beauty which is in the horse.14 What hast thou then? Nothing besides the use of opinion.
Therefore when in the use of opinion thou shalt govern thyself according to nature, then thou shalt have wherewith to vaunt thyself, for in any commodity which is thine, thou wilt glorify thyself.
Annotations
The use of opinion, This seemeth obscure to the unlearned. But it is even as he should say: In all things we ought not to follow appetite, or the common opinion, but the judgement of reason. For to use well opinion, is nothing else than to judge well of all things, and to obey reason, not affection.
Cap. 11. What outward things are granted us, and how we should use them, by a similitude.
Even as in Navigation,15 when men make their abode at any haven, if the Mariner goeth to land for fresh water, and it happeneth that incidently by the way, he thinketh to gather cockles or oysters, yet nevertheless he ought to have regard of the ship, and oftentimes to look back, whether the Master calleth: and if he call thee, leave all behind, and return to the ship, lest that thou being bound like a beast, be not drawn by force to the ship. Even so it is, in the course of our life, as if for a cockle or an oyster, there be given us a wife and a child, or other things, which we hold dear, and wherein we take pleasure, they ought not to put us from our purpose unto nature agreeable: But if the master do call, run unto the ship, leaving these things behind, not looking back towards them. But if thou be old, go never far from the ship, lest that thou being called, do fail, and that thou be not constrained. For he which willingly followeth not necessity, by force and maugre his teeth she draweth him.
Annotations
Lest that thou being called dost fail. He speaketh not of the outward power, but of the imbecility and weakness of the might: which the greater it shall be when age cometh on us, with more few things the mind is to be occupied: for because it is very difficult to be void of these, and to fulfil that which Philosophy commandeth. A single person (if other things be correspondent) may be in his life time contented with a little, and die with a more patient mind. A wife, children, and family, do more trouble and disquiet the husband and father, being as well in good health, as sick, than his life. I understand the ship, either to be Philosophy, or the trade of our life: the ruler and master of the Ship to be GOD: to whom when he calleth, whoso obeyeth not either is entreated as a slave, or else is utterly forsaken.
Cap. 12. How we may enjoy outward things without fault or trouble.
Wish not that the thing which is done,16 be done according to thy pleasure and will. But wish that it be done, even as it is done, and thou shalt be happy. Sickness is an impediment of the body, not of thy purpose, except thou wilt thyself.17 Halting is an impediment of the leg or foot, and not of thy purpose, and so consider in every inconvenience which may befall, and thou shalt find the impediment to appertain to another, and not to thee.
Annotations
Halting is an impediment of the foot, not of thy purpose. But thou wilt say when thou art purposed to go a journey (namely if thou want a horse, or a wagon) halting hindereth thee. Epictet will answer and say: If thou shalt follow my precepts, thou shalt begin no journey, which thou art not able to achieve. So the more and greater the impediments of the body shall be, so much the more thou shalt suppress appetite, and shalt take fewer things in hand. But thou dost say, that this is the impediment of purpose, and therefore very troublesome. Epictet denieth it to be an impediment, to desire nothing rashly and in vain: but affirmeth it to be the proper part and office of a Philosopher. Verily, even a fool doth understand this, that it is better to make appetite obey reason, than to burn in vain desires. The impediment to appertain to another and not to thee) If he would grant the foot to be a part of the body, (neither doth he deny it) and the body to be part of man (which he seemeth to deny) when his foot is postered and shackled, the body is also cumbered, the body being cumbered, man himself at least wise partly is cumbered, but if the body be the instrument of man, doubtless it cannot be denied, but that the instrument being mutilate and unperfect, the work shall be more unperfect and unmeet. For thou shalt have the overthrow, if thy Sword or Dagger lack hilts and handle.
Cap. 13. Of the remedies which we have against all accidents.
In every accident thou must incontinently consider what puissance and strength thou hast to withstand that which is happened.18 If any mischief befall unto thee, thou shalt find virtue which is good and wholesome, as against voluptuousness, continency. If labour be offered thee, thou shalt find strength: if wrong, patience: and if thou shalt thus accustom thyself, thou shalt never be troubled with imaginations.
Annotations
Thou shalt not be troubled with imaginations) That is, thou shalt never be overcome and subdued with pleasure and sorrow, but shalt conquer naughty desires, and affections, by the help of wisdom and virtue.
Cap. 14. What manner of men we ought to show ourselves, when we lose outward worldly goods.
Never say that thou hast lost any thing,19 but that thou hast restored it. If thy son die, he is restored. Thy livelihood is taken away, hast thou not restored it? But he which deprived thee of it, is an ill man. What matter maketh it to thee, by whom he which gave it, hath eftsoons taken it? Have a care and regard to all things, keeping and using them (during the time only that thou hast them in thy custody) as things unto other men belonging, even as the wayfaring man doth to his lodging.
Cap. 15. That a man ought not to lose the quietness of mind, for exterior and worldly things.
If thou wilt profit thyself,20 let pass these cogitations. If I shall not be careful of my affairs, I shall not have wherewith to live. If I correct not my servant, he will be naught. For it is far better to famish without sorrow and fear, than to live in abundance with a troubled mind. And it is much better, that the servant should be faulty, than thou which art his master unhappy. Then thou must begin with the least things, the Oil is spilt, the Wine is stolen. Consider with thyself, that quietness and security of the mind cost thee so much: for nothing is freely gotten. If thou call thy servant, imagine it may so fall out, that he heareth thee not, or hearing thee, to do nothing which thou wouldest have him do. But that he is not worth so much, that for him thou shouldst be troubled.
Annotations
It is far better to famish, etc. It may be asked not without a cause whether so great constancy may agree with man’s nature, that it may suffer and endure extreme hunger?
Cap. 16. That for the estimation of the people we ought not abandon virtue.
If thou wilt profit thyself, be not displeased, if for outward things, thou seem to other mad or foolish.21
Annotations
If thou wilt profit That is to say in Philosophy and garnishing of the mind. For he understandeth and meaneth that progression, whereby the tranquillity and liberty of the mind is increased. Be not displeased, if for, etc. For whoso regardeth not pleasures, riches, and honour, namely if he may obtain them: of all men he is accounted a fool, namely in these days. But in times past divers Philosophers and good men for the love they had to virtue abandoned all worldly wealth and promotions, as Crates, Diogenes, and this our Epictete.
Cap. 17. Against vain glory.
Seek not to seem learned and expert in any thing,22 and if to any thou dost seem, trust not thyself: for thou knowest it is not easy for a man to keep his purpose agreeable unto nature, and to embrace exterior things, but it must needs be, that he which is careful of one, should be negligent in the other.
Cap. 18. What things we ought to desire, and what we ought not.
If thou wilt have thy wife,23 thy children, and thy friends to live for ever, thou art a fool. For thou wilt have in thy power the things which are not, and wilt have the things to be thine, which are belonging to other men. And so if thou wilt not have thy servant to offend, thou art a fool, for thou wilt have vice to be no vice. But if thou wilt not be frustrate of that which thou dost desire, this thou mayest do: herein then exercise thyself.
Annotations
For thou wilt have vice to be no vice, He meaneth (as I suppose) that boys and all manner of men, by nature are inclined to vice: and that vices cannot be repelled, but by philosophy which young and tender age is not able to receive.
Cap. 19. What things make us bond, and what free.
He is Master and Lord of any man,24 to whom (nill he, will he) he may either give or take away. He then which will be free, let him neither desire, nor flee any thing, which is in another man his hand, and power, otherwise of necessity he shall be constrained to serve.
Annotations
He is Master of any man, etc. How many Masters then hath Fortune laid upon us? How many more do we lay upon us, through the insatiable desire of transitory things?
Cap. 20. A rule to elect and choose things present, past, and to come, by a similitude.
Remember that thou must make comparison of thy life to a banquet:25 where if the meat stand before thee, thou must take it modestly: if he, which doth bring it, do pass by thee, stay him not, or if he be not yet come to thee, be not over greedy thereof: but stay until he come to thee. In like manner thou must dispose thyself, towards thy children, towards thy wife, towards great men, and towards riches, so at length thou shalt be worthy the table of the Gods. But if thou take not that which is set before thee, but dost refuse it: then thou shalt not only be worthy of their table, but to be their companion: for when Diogenes, and Heraclitus and other like to them did thus, worthily, and of very good right they were divine, and so were accounted.
Annotations
Worthy the table of the Gods) He signifieth, that the despising of outward and worldly things is a certain heavenly thing, and that it maketh a man like to God. They were divine, and so were accounted. Arrogantly doubtless, and ignorantly. For how far doth even the excellentest man that ever was differ from the least part of the Godhead?
Cap. 21. By what means we must govern our Imagination about such things, as seem to be eschewed.
When thou dost see any man sorrowful,26 and torment himself either because he hath no tidings of his son, either because he is dead, either because he hath spent all, beware enter not into imagination, that this maketh him unhappy: but have readily in remembrance that it is not the accident, which troubleth him (seeing it tormenteth not another) but his opinion conceived thereof. But if thou fall in talk with him, accommodate thyself to his perturbation, and moreover if the matter so require, weep also with him for company: but take heed that thou sorrow not inwardly.
Cap. 22. That it lieth not in us to choose the state of our life, but to use it even as it chanceth, by a very apt similitude.
Thou must remember that thou art one of the players in an interlude,27 and must play the part, which the author thereof shall appoint, thou must play be it long, be it short. If he appoint thee to play the beggar, the Cripple, the Prince, or the private person, do it well and wittily, for it lieth in thee to play that part, whereunto thou art appointed, and in another to choose and appoint thee.
Annotations
Which the authors thereof shall appoint, That is, whether he be a comical, or a tragical Poet? As concerning the very matter the Greek Epigram doth declare.
Which may thus be Englished: What is our life? a gawish game, a sweet delighting play. Then cares in gaming lay aside, or live a miser aye.
Nazianzenus doth almost signify the same, but with a more gravity and piety, in these verses worthy to be had in remembrance.
Which may after this sort be Englished.
Cap. 23. By what means we ought to govern our Imagination, in looking for divers things.
If thou take the croaking of a crow to be unlucky,28 let not that imagination move thee, but judge immediately in thyself, and say: That portendeth nothing to me, but either to my body, or to my possession, or to my estimation, or to my wife, or to my children: but as touching myself, they signify nothing but good, at least wise if I will: for whatsoever shall chance, it lieth in me to have the profit and commodity of it, if I will.
Annotations
If thou take the croaking, etc. We have instead of divination by flying and crying of birds Astrology: Which if by yearly revolutions and progressions of the stars, it threaten damages and dangers, let us not use Epictet his counsel, but godly prayers.
Cap. 24. How to be unconquerable, being the cause of the former precept, and as it were the conclusion.
Thou mayest be invincible,29 if thou never enter into battle, for thou art uncertain, whether it lie in thee or no, to have the victory.
Annotations
Thou mayest be unconquerable. This saying dependeth upon the division of things made in the beginning. They are conquered, which covet other men’s goods, that is, such as belong to the body, and are placed in fortune’s hand. They conquer, which resist naughty opinions and desires, so that they contend according to the law.
Cap. 25. Which is the readiest way to virtue.
Take heed that in following thy imagination thou say at no time,30 the man is happy, whom thou dost see advanced either to honour, or authority, or renowned: for if the substance of goodness be in the things, which are subject to us, there neither envy, nor emulation taketh any place. Then thy purpose is not to be Emperor,31 or King, but free, and frank. But unto that thing there is but one certain way, that is, the contempt of such things as are not in us.
Annotations
For if the substance of goodness, etc. The understanding of this sentence is uttered stoically in dark words. He which seeketh all good things of himself, is of a quiet mind: whoso is of a quiet mind, he doth neither envy, nor emulate. For seeing that lack of pain called in Latin Indolentia excludeth all perturbations:32 verily it excludeth envy and emulation. But if these affections do rule in any: it is manifestly gathered thereof, that he is far from the tranquillity of the mind, and doth not obey the precepts of Philosophy.
Cap. 26. A solution of them which seem to let the things before mentioned, and how a man should not be angry.
Remember,33 that he, which taunteth or beateth, is not the author of reproach, but the opinion conceived of the same as reproachful. Then when any doth kindle thee to wrath, understand that thou art moved to anger through thine opinion. Wherefore especially endeavour thyself,34 that imaginations pluck not consent from thee, for if thou shalt once suppress it for a certain time, thou shalt more easily be thy own Master.
Cap. 27. How to learn, and set our mind in high things.
Set before thy eyes, death, banishment, and all things which seem terrible, but especially death: in so doing, thou shalt not think upon base and vile things, and shalt never be exceeding covetous.
Annotations
And shalt never be exceeding covetous. Syracides affirmeth,35 that the imagination of death, and God his judgement doth fear us from sin. Which if it do: we are taught to suffer adversity much more patiently, and to despise prosperity, because of their sorrow and profit, which endureth for a little space.36 So Cicero. All pleasure saith he is to be esteemed as nothing, which when it is past, it is as if there had been none at all. But in great grief of the body and anguish of the mind, one hour seemeth longer than a whole year.
Cap. 28. The second part, wherein he doth point him out which hath already profited. And doth first dissolve such things, as come in ure to the students of Philosophy.
As soon as thou hast determined to lead a perfect life,37 prepare and address thyself to be scorned and mocked of many, and to hear what they speak of thee, whereof cometh this sudden sageness and gravity? whereof cometh this sadness? lay apart thy sad sour countenance. But yet retain and keep these things which seem best to thee, in such sort, as if this were the front where God hath ordained and placed thee to fight.38 And if thou persist in the same things, they which before have mocked thee, will have thee in admiration: but if like one fleeing away, thou give over thy enterprise, thou shalt be double as much mocked and scorned.
Annotations
Lay apart thy sad sour countenance. That is, a musing countenance, sad gravity and haughtiness of mind. And it appeareth by this short and quick sentence of Menander,39 that this was the countenance of Philosophers. They which look stately, say, that Solitariness is meet for meditation.
Cap. 29. That boasting destroyeth the state of a Philosopher, in showing whereunto he ought to lean.
If it chance at any time, that thou give thyself to the things which are not in us, and that thou dost desire to please any man, understand that at the same present thou art fallen from thy state.40 Wherefore in all things let this suffice thee, to be a Philosopher: But if thou dost covet to seem to any a Philosopher, let it be to thyself, and that shall be sufficient.
Annotations
If it chance at any time that thou give thyself, etc. He forbiddeth the desire of glory, and seeking for ostentation, which affection it will be long before it take place in good and learned men. He would have a Philosopher to keep himself within the limits of his conscience, as an oyster within his shell, and to judge that, the most noble show of his virtue. Thou art fallen from thy state, That is to say, thou art vanquished.
Cap. 30. How to answer to such stays as would hinder a man from wisdom.
Let not these cogitations torment thee,41 I shall not be in honour nor in place, where I shall be regarded: for if to be without honour is an ill thing, thou canst not be in evil for another thing, no more than in a dishonest thing. Is it in thee to bear rule, or to be bidden to a banquet? No. What is this then, but to be without honour? and how sayest thou, that thou shalt not be esteemed, whom it behoveth to meddle in those things only which are in our power, in which thou mayest bear a great sway and stroke. But thou wilt say I cannot profit my friends. What dost thou call to profit?42 shall they have no money of thee? neither wilt thou make them citizens of Rome? But who told thee that these things be in us, and other men’s works? Who can give to another that he himself hath not? Get it, (say they) that we may have it, also. If I may get it,43 keeping myself modest, faithful, and valiant, show me the way, and I will get it. If ye think it meet, that I should lose my goods, that you should get such things as are not good, see yourselves how unreasonable and ungrateful you are? But if thou prefer a faithful and sincere friend before money, herein help me, and think it not meet that I should do the things whereby I should lose modesty and fidelity: But I cannot succour nor aid my country.44 What dost thou call succour and aid? That it shall not have of thee, nor by thy means, fair and sumptuous buildings, nor baths? What then? hath it not shoes by the Shoemaker and Armour by the Armorer? It is sufficient when every vocation doth his work. If thou get it a faithful and modest member, dost thou think, that thou bringest it but a little profit? very great doubtless. In so doing thou art not unprofitable to it. In what state shall I be in my country? in that thou mayest, keeping always fidelity and modesty. But if supposing to aid it thou lose modesty and fidelity, what profit shalt thou do to it, which art become impudent and disloyal.
Annotations
Thou canst not be in evil for another thing, This sentence dependeth upon the opinion of the Stoics, that only honesty is good, and only vice is naught. The contempt and despising of me, if I do my duty, is not my vice, therefore neither my evil, but their vice and evil who of a perverse judgement and naughty mind do contemn, despise, and misuse me without cause. Show me the way, He signifieth that riches and dignity is gotten by nothing else but by deceit, and for that cause a good man ought to despise them. Neither doth he speak of them, which show themselves unworthy of honour, and they are the cause, that they are not regarded. A faithful and sincere friend, Nowadays most men had liefer to have money. Neither do they think that a poor friend may help us in any thing. So are endowed maidens preferred before them, who are chaste, and well brought up, if perhaps there be any such, and do so continue. Wherefore the wooers peradventure are to be pardoned, who in so uncertain a hazard of chastity, and honesty, had rather to abide the unquietness of rich than of poor wives. Neither hath it Shoes by the Shoemaker, nor Armour by the Armorer. The sense is: sumptuous buildings, baths, and the city of Rome is no more to be required of a Philosopher, than weapons of the Shoemaker, or Shoes of the Smith: seeing that it is the duty of a Philosopher, to train up his countrymen in virtue, as it is the Shoemaker’s duty to make Shoes, and the Smith’s, Weapons.
Cap. 31. A continuation of the solution of such things as do hinder him which doth begin to study philosophy and wisdom, in showing that a man should not move himself, for that which chanceth to another and that he hath nothing of another without giving of his own.
Is there any placed before thee at a feast?45 or was reverence done to him before it was done to thee? or is he preferred before thee in counsel? If these things be good, thou must rejoice, that thy neighbour hath them: if they be ill: then be not sorrowful, because they chanced not to thee. Then remember in giving thy mind to nothing else,46 but to the things which are in us, thou canst not attain to the like things, which other do in them which are not in us. How may it be done, that a man frequenting not thy house shall have like things as he which haunteth thy house, or he that seeketh not friendship and favour, as he which doth? or he which doth not please and praise thee, as he which doth please and praise thee? Thou shalt be unjust and unsatiable if thou have not paid for such things as thou hast bought, but dost require to have them for nothing. Admit the case I could not buy lettuce for a halfpenny,47 if any then buy a halfpenny worth of lettuce, and thou dost buy none: think not thyself in worser case and to have less than he, which hath bought lettuce: for as he hath bought so thou hast not given thy halfpenny. Even so it fareth, thou art not bidden to a man’s feast, because thou hast not given him as much as his feast cost him. He selleth it for praise, he selleth it for service. Give him then (if thou think it good) the price, for the which he sold it thee. But if thou wilt not perform that and take these things, thou art unsatiable and foolish. Hast thou given nothing instead of the feast? Yes marry, for thou hast not praised him, whom thou wouldest, and hast not suffered him in his portly going.
Annotations
If these things be good, Because they are good, they are sorrowful that they could not attain to them: because they be evil, they are glad, that they are chanced to other. And hast not suffered, etc. Pride and ambitious salutations of rich men do seem to be understood in this place very troublous to a simple and learned man, in like manner salutations, retinues, praises. But perhaps rich men given to pleasures, going in their pomp, were wont on every side to lean and cleave to Parasites.
Cap. 32. What things are common even according to the will of nature.
The purpose and will of nature,48 may be judged by these things, in which we differ not one from another: as for example, if a man’s servant break his Master’s cup or any other thing, incontinently it is said this is a thing which oftentimes chanceth: remember then when thine is broken, that thou be the same manner of man, as thou wert when the other man’s cup was broken. And so do in greater things. If a man’s child or wife chance to die, there is no man but will say incontinently this is natural. Notwithstanding every man when any of his is dead, he doth lament and bewail pitifully: But we must remember how we are disposed, when we have heard any such thing of others.
Cap. 33. How one ought to understand the nature of ill.
Even as the white whereat Archers shoot,49 is not set there, where it may not be stricken, so it is of the nature of ill in this world, for it is not set out to be embraced, but to be eschewed: as if goodness were set for the white, and evil were all that, where the white were not, besides the white, the Archer hath an ample and large space to shoot from the white: so without the only mark of goodness on every side is placed evil, which is as easy to be done and committed, as it is difficult to hit the white, or to do good.
Cap. 34. We ought not abandon our mind to wrath for injuries done: and how to take in hand our enterprises.
If any deliver thy body to the first he meeteth, it will grieve thee exceedingly: but when thou dost yield thy mind to the first that cometh, as when thou art wronged, thy mind is troubled and heavy, art not thou ashamed?50 Before thou take any thing in hand, consider first the beginning, and the sequel, and then take it in hand. If thou do not so thou shalt never be certain and sure in thy enterprises, not regarding that which may befall, but after when any dishonest things chance, thou shalt be ashamed.
Annotations
If any deliver thy body to the first he meeteth, He argueth from a lesser thing to a more, after this sort: thou wilt be angry with them, which gave power to any to violate thy body (such is the condition of them which are banished) how much more oughtest thou to be angry with thyself, which art wont to give power to every man to hurt thy mind, whereas it lieth in thee not to be hurt of any man at all?
Cap. 35. An effectual example to consider what may befall in every thing which we shall take in hand.
Wilt thou conquer at the plays Olympia?51 And I by the faith of my body: for it is a very honourable thing, but consider well the beginning, and the sequel and then take the matter in hand. Thou must order well thyself, and use necessary meats, abstain from delicate and dainty things, and exercising thyself, according as it is expedient for the time and hour appointed, be it hot or cold, not drinking water or wine, if occasion so require. And briefly thou must commit thyself wholly to the chief of the games as to the Physician in doing that which he shall appoint thee. Afterward enter into fight, and sometime to have thy hand hurt, thy foot out of joint, to swallow down much dust, to receive grievous strokes, and otherwhile after all this to be vanquished. When thou hast considered all these things, if thou be willing, go and fight, otherwise thou shalt be like the little boys which are now wrestlers, now swordplayers, now trumpeters, forthwith players in tragedies. So thou also now a fighter, now a swordplayer, afterward an Orator, at length a Philosopher: but thoroughly nothing at all, but as an Ape thou dost counterfeit and resemble all things, and now one thing shall like thee, now another: for thou hast not done thy enterprise advisedly, in foreseeing the circumstances, but adventurously following a light and cold desire. So the greater number, when they see a Philosopher, or when they hear say that Socrates speaketh well, (but who can speak so well as he?) they will incontinently dispute and reason of Philosophy, and search the causes and nature of things. Man first consider the thing, and the quality thereof, and then enterprise it.52 Afterward try whether thy nature be able to endure that which may happen. Wilt thou be a wrestler? behold thy arms, thy thighs, and thy loins: For nature mother of all things, hath framed every man to some particular thing. Dost thou think that endeavouring thyself about these things thou mayest live as thou hast been accustomed? As to drink so much as thou wert wont, to be angry so much as thou wert wont? Thou must be vigilant, thou must travail, thou must set aside thy proper affairs, thou must be mocked of boys, despised of all the world, and in all things to have least authority, be it in honour, in office, or in judgement, and in all other affairs.53 Then consider all these things, and look whether in their stead, thou hadst liefer to have rest and liberty, without any perturbation. But if thou hadst not liefer to have it, see that thou take not in hand many things, to the end that (as I have told thee) like little boys, thou be not now a philosopher, now a lawyer, afterward an advocate, lastly the Proctor of Caesar. All which things knit in one, can in no wise agree: for it must needs be that thou be either a good or an ill man, that thou addict thyself to interior or exterior things: that thou possess the place of a Philosopher and well advised man, or of a Fool and Idiot.
Annotations
At the plays Olympia. Olympia were plays as running, wrestling, and such other feats of activity accustomably kept in the honour of Jupiter Olympicus, at Pisa and Helides Cities in Greece. Man first consider, He signifieth as to wrestling, to leaping and running, all are not meet, so neither to Philosophy, both have need of patience of body and mind. Of which things, whoso is destitute, he shall be rather a counterfeit than a very wrestler and Philosopher. Thou must be mocked of little boys,) Verily Philosophers were wont of all men to be despised, but great stout champions were in admiration.
Cap. 36. That duties do arise of nature, and that they are considered how a man should behave himself towards any man, next of the duties towards men.
Duty is measured by mutual affections.54 If thou have a father, thou must regard and honour him: give place to him in all things, and if he chide or beat thee, endure it. He is a naughty father thou wilt say. Nature hath enjoined us the obedience of the father without mention of good. Art thou not joined by nature with a good father? No, but with a father. Wherefore do thy duty towards him, and consider not what he doth: but do such things, whereby thou mayest keep thy purpose agreeable to nature. No man will hurt thee except thou wilt. Thou shalt be then hurt, when thou shalt think thyself hurt. So thou shalt do the duty of neighbour to neighbour, of Citizen to Citizen, of lord to lord, if thou accustom thyself to consider the mutual affections.
Annotations
By mutual affections. Affections are used as a certain rule to measure duties by.
Cap. 37. What our duties are towards GOD, and how to behave us in his doings.
The principal point of honouring God, is to think well of him, to believe that he is, that he hath created all things, and that well and justly he governeth them:55 afterward to obey him, accepting all things that he doth, as proceeding of a very good intent. In so doing, thou shalt not blaspheme God, neither shalt thou accuse him of negligence. Thou art not able to do this, otherwise, except thou withdraw thyself from the things which are not in us, and placing good and ill in them which are in us. But if thou esteem any of the things, which are not in us, to be good or ill, thou must of necessity, when thou dost not attain to that which thou wouldest, or when thou dost fall into that which thou dost shun, blame and hate the cause of such an accident which is good. All living creatures have this by nature,56 that they flee and eschew such things, and seem unto them noisome, and their causes: but contrariwise they search, and marvel at these things which seem to bring profit, and the causes of them. He then which thinketh himself hurt, can take no delight in that which unto him seemeth hurtful. So it is impossible that a man hurt may rejoice. And hereof it cometh to pass that the son doth check the father, when the father maketh him not partaker of the things, which seem good unto him. This is that, which made discord between Polynices and Eteocles, because they esteemed rule good. For this cause the husbandman, for this cause the Mariner, for this cause the Merchant, for this cause they which lose their wife and children do oftentimes defile and detest God, for whereas utility is,57 there is also piety. Wherefore he that doth endeavour to desire and flee that, even as he ought, by the same means he observeth and keepeth piety.58 As touching offerings and oblations let every man do them according to the guise of his country: purely, without superfluity, according to his ability, without negligence or niggardship.
Annotations
Whereas utility is, there is piety, O wonderful sentence, and also wicked to see to: but so applied that it uncovereth the dissimulation of man’s mind, and can scarce be nothing more agreeable to religion. Guise of his country. Forasmuch as piety consisteth in the mind, he thinketh that we should not much regard ceremonies. Which if it might be persuaded to some men which are in these days, we should live more quietly. It might be persuaded, if we would rather endeavour to live according to religion, than to dispute of religion: if we were rather desirers of the verity than of vanity, that is, of ambition, of emulation, of covetousness, of revengement, and of such like confusions and destructions of the mind, if there be any other.
Cap. 38. What manner of man he ought to be that cometh to a Diviner, and how to use divinations, wherein resteth our duty towards God, and towards ourselves.
If thou desire and seek to know that which is to come of any thing,59 first thou must understand that thou art ignorant of that shall come, and therefore thou dost go to the Diviner to know it of him. Notwithstanding if thou be wise thou art not ignorant what it is, nor the quality thereof. For if it be among the number of the things which are not in us, truly it is necessary, that it be neither good nor ill. Remove then from thee (if thou go to the Diviner) all desire and eschewing other thou shalt come to him trembling and quaking. But when thou shalt understand, whatsoever shall befall to appertain nothing to thee, and of thee not to be passed upon, thou mayest use it well, and no man shall forbid thee. Therefore go and ask counsel of God, as of him who can give thee very good, and after he hath given thee counsel, remember whom thou hast called to counsel, and whose counsel thou hast despised. Counsel may be demanded of the Diviner (as Socrates saith) for such things, whose consideration is referred to the end, the knowledge of which end, occasion cannot be given by any manner of means, nor any art. And therefore thou must not ask counsel of the Diviner, whether thou shalt put thy life in danger for thy country, or for thy friend, if need require, for if he perceive any unlucky sign, it is altogether manifest, that it signifieth death, or some impediment of thy body, or banishment: but reason telleth and persuadeth thee, that thou must put thyself in danger for Country, or for thy friend when need requireth. Give ear then to that which the great Divine Apollo saith, who did chase out of his temple, the man, which helped not his friend being in danger of death.
Annotations
Remember whom thou hast called to counsel, It must needs be, that the cunning of the diviners, soothsayers, was in divination very great. Otherwise a man of so great gravity would not have accounted their prophecies, for divine answers.
Cap. 39. Duties towards ourselves, and first of such as tend to the constancy of manners, and what things let it, and chiefly of talk and silence.
Thou must prescribe a rule and fashion,60 which from henceforth thou shalt observe when thou art alone and when thou art in company. Let silence be kept for the most part: or let necessary things be talked of, and the same in few words. But if the time require thee to speak,61 speak: but not of all things, not of the combat between fencers, not of running with horses, not of wrestlers, not of meats and drinks triflingly, nor principally of men, in praising or blaming them, or comparing them with others. And if thou be able, change thy familiars’ Communication into that which is honest and comely. But if thou be environed with strangers, hold thy peace.
Annotations
Environed with strangers, He understandeth those men, whom because of their estimation and authority he dareth not admonish.
Cap. 40. Of laughing.
Laugh not much,62 nor at all communication, neither aloud.
Cap. 41. Of Oaths.
Swear not,63 neither make an oath if it be possible for thee. But if thou canst not otherwise do, do it when it shall be needful.
Cap. 42. What conversation may do.
Frequent not the banquets and familiarity of the common sort,64 and strangers. But if occasion so require, be mindful and take heed that thou become not one of the common sort. And understand thou that he which wrestleth with the defiled, must needs be defiled also.
Cap. 43. Of the use of such things as belong to the body.
As touching the body, take such things as shall be to his use and also be profitable for the mind, as meat, drink, apparel, harbour. But as touching dainty and delicate dishes, thou must altogether reject them, and banish them from thee.
Cap. 44. Of the act of Nature.
Touching Venery we ought as much as is possible, to lead a chaste life before marriage. But if we be constrained, we must take nothing but that which is lawful: notwithstanding reprove them not which use it, in blaming them, and vaunting thyself abroad, that thou dost not use it.
Annotations
In blaming them. Christian charity commandeth that sinners should be reproved, and obstinate persons to be eschewed.
Cap. 45. Against anger, and what manner of men we should show ourselves towards backbiters.
If any bring thee word,65 such a man misreporteth and backbiteth thee. Excuse not that which he hath said, but make this answer: he is ignorant of many other great faults, and imperfections which are in me, otherwise, he would not only have said this.
Cap. 46. How to behave ourselves in shows and triumphs.
It is not requisite to frequent often the shows and tournaments.66 But if at any time occasion requireth, see that thou seem not to favour any man more than thyself, that is, wilt thou only have that done which is done: and him only to conquer, which conquereth? For so thou shalt not be impeached. Abstain thyself altogether from shouting, from consenting countenance, and let not thy gesture be sad and grave, but somewhat merry. At thy return from the shows, talk not much of the things which have been there done or said, seeing they avail nothing to thy amendment.
Cap. 47. Of the desire of such as go to hear others’ communication.
Approach not near them, whom thou seest to commune apart, and be not thou present if it be possible, or as seldom as thou mayest. But if thou be present keep in such wise thy constancy, that thou show thyself void of all perturbations.
Cap. 48. When one hath to speak with a noble personage.
If thou have any thing to do especially with such as are of noble blood,67 and great authority. Consider what Socrates or Zeno have done herein, or the wisest man that ever thou didst know, and so thou shalt not be in doubt, how thou must behave thyself.
Annotations
What Socrates or Zeno, That may be gathered out of both their sayings and doings, forasmuch as we have not any thing written of neither of them. But unless thou shalt be endued with the learning and constancy of them both foolish imitation will turn thee to shame. And perhaps they observed not every where a seemliness and grace.
Cap. 49. How we ought to prepare ourselves, when we go to speak with a man of honour.
When thou wilt go to such a man as is of great honour,68 presuppose in thy mind, what may chance, that (possibly) thou shalt not be received, that thou shalt be shut out of doors, that the gate shall not be opened, or that he will not regard thee. Afterward ponder with thyself, if with all these things, it be expedient for thee to go to him: and when thou shalt come before him, suffer and endure that which shall be done, and say not to thyself: I deserve not to be thus entreated: for it is too common a thing to reprove and blame the things which are not in us.
Cap. 50. When we meet with many men, how to frame our communication.
In company speak not overmuch, nor beyond measure, of thy deeds, neither of thy dangers: for it cannot so much content other to hear them as thyself to rehearse them.69 See also that thou move no laughter by thy communication, for that (I wot not how) engendreth disdain, and also causeth that no reverence is given to thee by them which are present. And very often leadeth thy communication to filthy and dishonest talk:70 But if it befall, and that the matter and time require it, reprove him that shall use such ribaldry and filthiness. If not, at the least show and declare by silence and shamefastness, that such communication doth displease thee.
Cap. 51. How to resist pleasure.
If thou conceive any pleasure in thy mind,71 be circumspect (even as in other things) that she beguile thee not, but examine the matter, and take space to deliberate on it. Afterward consider both the times, that is to say, the time wherein thou dost enjoy pleasure, and the time wherein after the enjoying of it thou mayest repent thee for having enjoyed it. And afterward reprove thyself, and consider how well at ease and contented thou shalt be, if thou abstain thyself, and in so doing thou dost commend thyself. But if the matter seem to require thee to do it, beware that her flatteries, her sweetness, and her enticements overcome thee not, but consider how far better it shall be, if thou be able to win the victory of that conflict.
Cap. 52. That we ought not to leave off our good purpose, whatsoever men say.
When thou art resolved to do any thing,72 and hast not yet done it, refuse not to be seen in doing thereof, although other may judge amiss thereof, for if thou do evil, thou must give over thy work: if thou do well, fear them not who wrongfully, and without cause shall reprove thee.
Cap. 53. Of the honesty that we ought to keep at the table.
Who hath said:73 it is day, and it is night, taking the proposition severally we ought to agree, but to understand it together, it is not to be received. So at the table to choose for ourselves the greatest, and the best part of the meat, is a great commodity towards the body, but it is against the honest participation that we ought to have at the table. Then if at any time thou be bidden to a banquet,74 remember that thou must not only have regard to the meat, for the profit of thy body: but also to honesty, and to behave thyself at the table, as thou oughtest.
Annotations
Whereas before he compared our life to a feast, let this precept be applied to all the parts of our life: and every where let there not be a respect to our private desire and utility, but of equity and society, and let the will of the feaster, that is God, be considered.
Cap. 54. That we should not undertake more than we are able to do.
If thou have taken more in hand,75 than thou art able to achieve or bring to pass: thou shalt not bring it to effect, and also hast omitted that which thou wert able to perform.
Cap. 55. That we ought to be circumspect as well to save the mind harmless, as the body.
Even as in going thou dost take heed that thou step not upon a nail,76 or that thou wrest not thy foot: so in leading thy life take heed, that thou hurt not thy mind, the governess of all thy doings, which if we observe in all things, we shall without danger take them in hand.
Cap. 56. Of the possession of such things as belong to the body.
The body is to every man the form of riches,77 as the foot is of the shoe. If then in this thou persevere, thou shalt keep the mean: if thou exceed, thou must needs as it were, fall down headlong: as if thou be more curious about the fashion of the shoe, than is needful for the foot, thou wilt make him of gold, after of purple, last of all set with studs of gold: for there is no end of that thing which hath once passed measure.
Cap. 56. For maidens unmarried.
Women after fourteen years of age are called of lovers Ladies:78 for after this age men (to the end to company with them) endeavour wholly to please them. To obtain then men’s good will afterward they become very curious in trimming and decking themselves. Wherefore they must be admonished, that for no other cause we esteem them, but because they are modest, wise and honest, bearing reverence and obedience to their husbands.
Cap. 57. That more care is to be had of the mind than of the body.
To persist and continue in things which belong to the body,79 for pleasure’s sake, as in much exercise, in much trimming, and adorning of the body, is sign of an abject mind, and very much swerving from nature, and also it is a sign of consenting to superfluity: for we embrace pleasure, and rejoice in things which we allow. We must think then the exceeding care of the body to be from the purpose: but principally we must be careful of that whereof the body is but the instrument, that is, the mind.
Cap. 58. A precept to learn patience and meekness.
When any hath misused thee either in word or deed, remember that he doth suppose it to be done and said according to his duty. Wherefore it is impossible for him to follow thy advice and counsel, but his own. But if he judge amiss, he is hurt which is deceived. For if any do judge hidden truth to be a lie, the truth hidden is not hurt, but he which shall be deceived. If so be then thou be persuaded, thou shalt show thyself gentle and patient towards him that hath injured thee. And at every thing thou shalt say, it hath so pleased him.
Annotations
He doth suppose it to be done according to his duty. Pletho putteth us in mind of the same,80 that also we should be blamed, which are able to persuade one thing, and cannot induce others into our opinion. But thou wilt say, oftentimes unreasonable and slanderous men know that such things as they do are dishonest and shameful for them to do. Epictetus maketh answer: they are so much the more worse and miserable: but thou art never the more worse and miserable. But their dishonesty is to me a damage, because they hurt my estimation, because they diminish my substance, because they do afflict my body by violence or witchcraft, because they hinder my commodities? Epictet will make answer, that these are none of thine, but other men’s, and to appertain nothing to thee. Whereof much is spoken of before. The hidden truth, As it is in Sophocles in Electra, Orestes was not therefore dead, because he had persuaded himself to bring his bones shut in a coffin to Egisthus and others.
Cap. 59. That all things partly do agree the one with the other, and partly do disagree.
Every thing hath two handles, one whereby it may be carried,81 the other whereby it may not. If thy brother be ill conditioned, take him not by that whereby he is ill conditioned, for it is the handle whereby he cannot be carried, but take him by that, whereby he is thy brother, and whereby he is nourished with thee, in so doing thou shalt take him by the handle, whereby he ought to be carried.
Cap. 60. That because of knowledge, or having more than other, we cannot infer that we are better.
These words agree not together I am richer than thou,82 therefore better. I am wiser and better learned than thou art, therefore I am better: but these agree far better. I am richer than thou art, then my possession is better than thine. I am wiser and better learned than thou art, my words then are better than thine, but thou art neither thy possession nor yet thy communication.
Annotations
But thou art neither, etc. Thou wilt say, yea: but because of riches, eloquence, and power, I am much regarded. The same doth Epictet reprove, who thinketh good only wisdom and virtue to be much set by. What man except he were a very naughty and wicked flatterer,83 hath had Nero the Emperor in great estimation, although besides his riches and Empire, he were eloquent, a Poet, and a Musician? The mind of a perfect man abhorreth to allow those, whose foolishness and dishonesty is known, in what fashion soever honour for a show be given to them, because of the gifts of fortune, and corrupt conversation.
Cap. 61. Of an exact judgement in things.
If any wash himself speedily, say not that he washeth himself naughtily,84 but speedily. If any drink much, say not that he drinketh naughtily, but much, for if thou know not why he doth it, how dost thou know that he doth naughtily? So it shall chance that we do receive and support the fantasies and imaginations of some, and to other we agree.
Cap. 62. Against glory and ostentation. And first as touching knowledge.
Repute not thyself a Philosopher in any case:85 neither dispute not much of precepts, but rather put some thing in execution, as at the table, teach not how one should eat his meat, but eat as it behoveth thee.86 For remember that Socrates did so set aside all ostentation. But if at any time these precepts come in question, speak as little as is possible, for it is dangerous to vomit that which the stomach hath not well digested. And if it chance, that a man tell thee, that thou knowest nothing, and that it moveth thee not,87 understand that this is a great entrance of thy work, for the sheep vomiting up their grass, declare not to the Shepherds how much they have eaten, but digesting it within they show without their fine wool and milk. Thou therefore show not, neither utter thy learning to the rude and ignorant: but declare some effects outwardly of that being well digested.
Cap. 63. Against the boasting of sobriety and sufferance.
Glory not thyself to have mortified,88 impaired, and weakened thy body through abstinence: Neither if thou hast drunken nothing but water, say not at every occasion, I drink nothing but water. But consider how much more abstinent the poor are, who crave alms, suffering and enduring much more than thou. Furthermore consider how many perfections and virtues thou hast not, which other have. But if thou wilt exercise thyself in pain and patience, do it by thyself, and seek not to advertise other of it, as they do who suffering wrong of great men, set images on fire, and say, we are undone, to the end to move and assemble the people. For a bragger is altogether mindful of worldly things, and turneth topsy-turvy the goodness of patience and abstinence, because he determineth the end of them is to have, the good opinion and praise of many.
Cap. 64. The description of a triple quality or property, that is, of the unlearned, of the Philosopher, and of him that beginneth to learn.
The condition and state of the unlearned is, to look for of himself neither profit nor damage, but of outward things. The state and condition of the philosopher is, to look for of himself all utility and discommodity. The sign of him which beginneth to profit is,89 that he dispraise no man, that he praise no man, that he complain of no man, that he accuse no man, that he speak nothing of himself, as though he were any body, or knew any thing. When he shall be at any time impeached or disturbed, he blameth none but himself. And if one commend him, he mocketh him covertly which commendeth him, if he be dispraised, he purgeth nor justifieth himself: but liveth like a sick person fearing to move and trouble any thing within him before he be recovered. He setteth apart all appetite, and fleeth the things which are against the nature of them which are in us. He useth a light endeavour about all things, and passeth not whether he be termed a Fool or an Idiot. And (in brief) he watcheth himself, as his Enemy and Spy.
Annotations
That he dispraise no man, That is through curiosity and too much diligence in other men’s matters, or provoked through self-love: Epictet commendeth Agrippinus, but why? that other should follow his example. He reproveth other, wherefore? that they should be amended.
Cap. 65. That learning is not only to be expounded but also to live according as it doth prescribe.
If any do vaunt that he can well interpret and expound the sentences of Chrysippus,90 say with thyself, if Chrysippus had not written darkly, and obscurely, I should have nothing wherewith to vaunt myself. But Chrysippus hath not written, to the end he would be interpreted, but to the end that according to his doctrine we should live. If then I use his precepts, then shall I attain to the goodness of them. But if I marvel at the interpretation, or if I can well interpret it myself, I marvel at the Grammarian, not at the Philosopher, or else play the Grammarian not the Philosopher. But what availeth it to have found written remedies, to understand them well, and being sick thyself not to use them?
Cap. 66. That we ought to persevere in goodness.
Thou must be stable and firm in thy good purpose and deliberation of life,91 even as in a law. Persevere therefore, even as if in transgressing, thou shouldest incur the crime of impiety. And whatsoever men talk of thee, regard it not, for that belongeth not to thee.
Cap. 67. That we ought not to defer from day to day, for to lead a perfect life.
How long yet wilt thou defer to esteem thyself at any time worthy of these things which are so excellent, and not to transgress one? But if from day to day thou dost defer the time, thou dost not advance but hinder thyself. Then incontinently accustom thyself to live as perfect, and to use well all accidents and chances. And in every thing suppose that the combat is ready for thee, and neglect no time, for that day in the which thou dost not profit, thou dost receive damage. After this manner Socrates became the wisest of all. But if thou be not yet Socrates, thou oughtest to live as one that would become Socrates.
Cap. 68. Three places in Philosophy, and the order of them together.
The first and most necessary place is that which appertaineth to the practice of knowledge:92 as, not to lie. The second which appertaineth to demonstrations: as, how cometh it to pass that this is demonstration? What demonstration is? what consequence is? what fighting is? what is true? what is false? Therefore the third place is necessary for the second, the second for the first. The most necessary of all, and wherein to rest ourselves is the first. But we do contrary, for we stay ourselves in the third, and therein bestow all our study, and make no account of the first, but are altogether negligent. And how? For we make leasings, and notwithstanding we have well near always no other thing in our mouth, why and wherefore we ought not to lie.
Annotations
Not to lie. And this is the active or moral part. We should not lie. This is called the judicial or natural part. To demonstrations. This is logic and Rhetoric, whereby we prove and try the truth, and disprove that which is false.
Cap. 69. Three sentences of the ancients to be had in mind. Of the which the first is of Cleanthes, the second of Euripides, the third of Plato.
Let us always have these three things in memory and before our eyes. The first is, Necessity draweth all things (will we nill we) even as God hath appointed, wherefore he which willingly followeth it, is wise. The second is if I recoil and give back, I shall be naught, and spite of my teeth weeping and wailing I must needs follow. But the third, O Crito, If it so please god, so be it. Anytus truly and Meletus may well kill me, but to hurt me, it lieth not in their power.
Annotations
It is marvel that this moral and available saying of Epictetus was omitted, [Greek] [Greek], that is, Bear and Forbear, which be used very often, and doth in a manner comprehend all that whereof mention is made at large in this book.
Footnotes
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A division of things. ↩
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The natural condition of things. ↩
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The effects of a good and evil judgement. ↩
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Our consideration is to be stirred up and a diligent preparation to be used. ↩
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One cannot serve virtue and vanity. ↩
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We must refrain our consent before the matter be plainly perceived. ↩
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A vain flight from discommodities maketh a man miserable, and a depriving of desires maketh a man unfortunate. ↩
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One newly entered in the doctrine of virtue ought not to take too much upon him. ↩
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The nature of the thing dearly loved is to be considered. ↩
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The circumstances of every business are to be considered. ↩
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A wise man is without complaint. ↩
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We are troubled with opinions, not with the things themselves. ↩
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We must vaunt in the riches of the mind, and not in the gifts of fortune. ↩
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The use of opinion is proper unto man. ↩
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We ought in all things principally to be mindful of God. ↩
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We must not covet in vain, that which is impossible. ↩
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A well framed mind is disturbed with nothing. ↩
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The power of the mind ought to resist adversity and naughty desires. ↩
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We do never lose our goods, but restore them, to him of whom we received them, that is to God. ↩
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The garnishing of the mind is to be regarded above all things. ↩
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We must take patiently the evil opinion of the multitude conceived of us. ↩
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It is hard to do many things at once. ↩
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We do in vain seek to keep those things inviolable, which are not in our power. ↩
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Who is a master. ↩
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Such things as are offered are to be taken: such things as are denied us, are not to be desired. ↩
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We must have regard to humanity in such sort, that the quietness of mind be retained. ↩
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We must pass the whole course and time of our life, according to God’s will. ↩
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A wise man taketh profit by every chance. ↩
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We must take in hand things agreeable to our strength. ↩
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He that seeketh for all good things of himself, he doth neither marvel at any man, nor envieth any. ↩
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There is one way to liberty: the despising of outward things. ↩
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[Greek] [Greek] ↩
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No man is hurt, but of himself. ↩
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Delay establisheth judgement. ↩
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Syracides. ↩
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Cicero. ↩
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A Philosopher ought not to regard the mockery of the people. ↩
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Constancy getteth victory. ↩
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Menander. ↩
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By this word Philosopher is meant a wise man. ↩
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That a Philosopher even of small substance, may much profit the common wealth, by teaching of virtue and his good example. ↩
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How a wise man aideth his friends. ↩
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We ought to require of every man but such things as he may and ought to perform. ↩
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How a wise man helpeth his country. ↩
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We must envy no man, and rejoice of another’s good fortune. ↩
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A benefit commonly is given for pleasure and service. ↩
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Whoso lacketh commodity lacketh also cost and disquietness. ↩
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We must not judge otherwise of our own misfortune than of other men’s. ↩
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It is in our choice whether we will be troubled with the opinion of ill things. ↩
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A premeditation and a diligent preparation putteth away ignominy and repentance. ↩
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Temerity is the mother of lightness and inconstancy. ↩
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Both the thing and our nature is to be considered and compared together. ↩
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Constancy is to be observed. ↩
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We must do our duty towards all men, although other men do not their duty towards us. ↩
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Their religion is nothing worth which do not place felicity in the riches of the mind. ↩
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Tull. 1. Offic. ↩
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Whereas utility is, there is piety. ↩
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He preferreth the rites of a country before the truth. ↩
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The diviner is not to be counseled of our duty, but of the success of certain actions. ↩
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We must determine who and what manner of men we will be. ↩
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We must rule our tongue. ↩
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Laughter. ↩
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Oaths. ↩
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Banquets. ↩
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An ill report is not to be passed upon. ↩
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Shows are to be seen with a quiet mind. ↩
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In meetings, we must follow the examples of wise men. ↩
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The difficult coming to noble men is to be suffered. ↩
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Laughter is not to be moved. ↩
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Ribaldry is to be abhorred. ↩
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It is better to despise than to embrace pleasure. ↩
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Our duty ought to move us, and not the communication of the people. ↩
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We must not have regard to our own lust but to the Commonalty. ↩
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In feasts modesty is to be observed. ↩
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We ought to measure our strength in all things. ↩
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We must endeavour to have a perfect mind. ↩
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A few things are sufficient for nature, but infinite substance sufficeth not covetousness. ↩
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Modesty in women is more to be regarded, than their beauty. ↩
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We must bestow much time in garnishing of the mind, but a little in the body. ↩
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Pletho. ↩
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The handle of humanity and not of immanity is to be taken. ↩
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We must not triumph of the gifts of fortune, but of the riches of the mind. ↩
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Nero. ↩
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Not only the deed itself, but the cause of the deed is to be considered. ↩
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Philosophy is not to be declared by words, but by deeds. ↩
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Nothing must be spoken unadvisedly. ↩
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The Sheep declare by their wool and milk how much they have eaten. ↩
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Ostentation is to be eschewed. ↩
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The signs of him which profiteth. ↩
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They are Grammarians not Philosophers, which do expound the precepts of wise men, and follow them not. ↩
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Precepts are to be obeyed, and words are not to be regarded. ↩
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Precepts are better than the cause of precepts, and the Method of demonstrations. ↩