6,000 words: approx. 12 pages plus end notes and bibliography.

The Enchiridion of Epictetus is thought to be a basic introductory text to Stoicism. It is however a very advanced text, that needs a lot of context. This is an attempt at that. This is neither a paper nor an essay, but more like a classroom exercise, encouraging a close reading the Stoics carefully, and thinking them through.

There is no phrase better known to students of Stoicism than these opening lines of the Enchiridion. This phrase is also the most widely misunderstood, being read in isolation from the rest of the philosophy of Epictetus in particular and Stoicism in general.

Rather than critiquing the wide range of interpretations in circulation, I want to start afresh by bringing this phrase into context. In Part 1, we will look at the language used in the original text; In Part 2, we can look at the fuller discussion of what is up to us in the first chapter of the more extensive Discourses of Epictetus.

Some things in the world are up to us while others are not. Up to us are our faculties of judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion; in short, whatever is our own doing

Enchiridion 1 [1]

To give a brief overview of the philosophy of Epictetus: a good life, a life well lived, can be achieved solely through the use of reason; otherwise expressed, this is our rational, linguistic ability to think about and assess our own fact and value judgments. It is metacognition, thinking about our thinking and coming to an understanding of what is true, false, what is of value and what is not, what is appropriate or inappropriate to do.

He uses many names to refer to this: the ruling faculty, the faculty of reason, the ability to make use of impressions, or prohairesis. It is rather a shame that the Enchiridion does not open with the following passage.

Some things are ours and some are not.  What is ours is prohairesis and everything that is the work of prohairesis ^[2]

Discourse 1.22.10

Part 1: An understanding of terms.

There have been many translations of the Enchiridion, with wide variation in the English terms used by each translator, making it hard to get a clear idea of what is meant by the opening phrase in question.

Of things, some are in our power, and others not. In our power are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and in one word, whatever are our own actions.

Carter 1758 ^[3]

Of things that exist, some depend upon ourselves, others do not depend upon ourselves. Of things that depend upon ourselves are our opinions and impulses, desires, and aversions and, briefly, all that is of our own doing.

Rolleston 1881 ^[4]

Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion, desire, aversion and in a word, whatever are our own acts

George Long 1890 ^[5]

Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and in a word everything that is our own doing.

Oldfather 1928 ^[6]

We are responsible for some things, while there are others for which we cannot be held responsible. The former includes our judgment, our impulse, our desire, aversion, and our mental faculties in general.

Dobbin 2008 ^[7]

Some things are within our power, while others are not, Within our power are opinion, motivation, desire, aversion in a word, whatever is of our own doing.

Hard 2014 ^[8]

Some things in the world are up to us, while others are not. Up to us are our faculties of judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion. In short, whatever is our own doing.

AA Long 2018 ^[9]

Some things are up to us and some are not. Up to us are judgment, inclination, desire, aversion—in short, whatever is our own doing.

Waterfield 2022 ^[10]

From the translations above, we can understand that judgments, opinions, impulses, motivations, desires, and aversions are the subject of discussion. We can take it that these refer to mental processes internal to a person.

However, the translators disagree on a critical term: In our power, depend upon, control, responsible for, or up to us do not mean precisely the same thing. They send us in all kinds of different directions.

We can look at the Greek text for the term behind the various translations. The expression in bold is the source of the confusion: I am using AA Long’s translation for the Enchiridion, which uses “up to us”.

Some things in the world are up to us, while others are not. Up to us are our faculties of judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion. In short, whatever is our own doing. ^[11]

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ ἐφ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μέν ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα·

The term we are after is eph’hemin [ἐφ’ ἡμῖν], and we can check the Greek dictionary as a first step in finding out what we are talking about.

The term eph comes from the Greek epi [ἐπῐ́], meaning on, in, to, or at.
The term hemin comes from the Greek hemeis [ἡμεῖς], meaning we or us in a form indicating possession.

So translated literally, eph’hemin means what is to us or what is ours. ^[12]

“this is to me” = “this is mine”
“this is to us” = “this is ours”

That this is about what belongs to us becomes clear as we read through the Enchiridion; Here is the full text. I have highlighted where there are references to what is ours:

1.1 Some things in the world are up to us, while others are not. Up to us are our faculties of judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion in short, everything that is our own doing.

1.2 Not up to us are our body and property, our reputations, and our official positions in short, everything that is not our own doing.

1.3 Moreover, the things up to us are naturally free, unimpeded, and unconstrained, while the things not up to us are powerless, servile, impeded, and not our own.

1.4 Keep this in mind then: if you think things naturally servile are free and that things not our own are ours, you will be frustrated, pained, and troubled, and you will find fault with gods and men.

1.5 But if you think you own only what is yours and that you do not own what is not yours, as you really don’t, no one will ever put pressure on you, no one will impede you, you will not reproach anyone, you will not blame anyone, you will not do a single thing reluctantly, no one will harm you, you will have no enemy, because nothing harmful will happen to you.

1.6 Keep in mind, then, that you have to be highly motivated if you want to achieve such great goals. You will have to forego some things completely and postpone others for the present.

1.7 But if you want both at the same time the things that are really yours plus prominence and wealth in addition you will probably not get even the latter because of wanting the former as well, and you certainly will not get the former, which are the only way to secure freedom and happiness.

1.8 Right now, then, make it your habit to tell every jarring thought or impression: “you are just an appearance and not what you appear to be.” ^[13]

1.9 Next, examine it and test it by these rules that you have. First and foremost: does it involve the things up to us, or the things not up to us? And if it involves one of the things not up to us, have the following response to hand: “not my business.”

A A Long: How to be Free.

Where translations above disagree over how to translate eph’hemin, the remainder of the text, where owning what is ours and not owning what is not ours, is discussed, has no disagreement at all.

And in both the Enchiridion and the Discourses, the following terms are used interchangeably.

ἐφ’ ἡμῖν:	eph’hemin	to us, ours
ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί[14]	ep emoi	to me, mine
ἐμὸν [15]	emon	mine
ἐστι σόν[16]	esti son	his
ἐπὶ σοί [17]	epi soi	within him
σὸν εἶναι [18]	son einei	to you, yours.
τὸ σὸν [19]	to son	your

Epictetus is talking about ownership and belonging, and what is ours is directly pointed out as the faculties of judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion.

Understanding that soul is the psyche or mind; that these faculties are functions of the mind is illustrated below. (All translations of the discourses are by Robin Waterfield unless otherwise noted)

Now, the psyche’s functions are inclination and disinclination, desire and aversion, aptitude, purposiveness, and assent. So what is it that makes the soul dirty and unclean in its performance of these functions? When it judges badly, that’s all. .

It follows that uncleanliness of the soul consists in bad judgments, what it takes to clean it is the introduction of the right kind of judgments, and a clean soul is one that has the right kind of judgments. Only such a soul is immune to confusion and contamination in the performance of its functions ^[20]

Discourse 4.11.6-7

Epictetus refers to these functions as erga. We see erga in the Enchiridion above as our own doing, and elsewhere erga is translated as my job or works ^{[21] [22],[23]}

And that to keep these functions clean or functioning correctly, which means not being confused or deluded, is a question of correct judgments.

To summarise, what is up to us or what is ours are exclusively functions of the mind. And they are all described as judgments. So we can rephrase our maxim.

What is ours are the functions of our mind.

And everything that is not this ability to make value judgments and act accordingly is not ours. They are not our functions, which is the second line of the Enchiridion.

Not up to us are our body and property, our reputations, and our official positions in short, everything that is not our own doing.

These are known as indifferents [adiaphora] or externals, which is everything that is not ours. The misleading name does not mean they are not important. The welfare of everybody is a prime concern for Epictetus, who, in common with all the Stoics, held that all our actions should point at the common good. ^[24],[25]

What is not ours is everything that is not the function of our mind.

Eph’Hemin

Looking more closely at the term eph’hemin: Epictetus was not the first to use it. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, and Chrysippus, the third head of the school, both used it ^[26].

While none of these Stoic philosophers were Aristotelians, the term eph’ hemin, as Aristotle used it, was in general use and commonly understood. This is the most straightforward explanation I can find and is very close to Stoic thinking and very much the same idea. ^{[27], [28],[29] [30]}

But if it is manifest that a man is the author of his own actions, if we are unable to trace conduct back to any other origins than those within ourselves, then actions of which the origins are within us [eph’hémin] themselves depend upon us [eph’hémin], and are voluntary

Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics 3.6 ^[31]

So what is eph’ hemin is our inner workings at the origin of what we do. And they are mental workings. They are the thoughts, beliefs, and judgments that we author. And this is the idea of “our own doing“; we are the origin of all our intentional actions

We can look more closely at the functions named; judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion, and we need to note that they generally come as a set. ^[32]

Judgment hupolepis/ὑπόληψις

Epictetus used the term to mean an accepted belief, broadly covering a range of beliefs from an assumption or an estimate through a weak opinion to an informed opinion through certainty and firm knowledge: it is an understanding that something is so.^[33],[34]

The Stoics focused on the act of assenting, the moment of judgment, correctly or incorrectly, to what they called impressions. The Stoics considered ALL of our mental events to be impressions, which include perceptions resulting from interactions with the world informed by experience but include beliefs, inferences, recollections, and spontaneous thought. So impressions are everything we are aware of in our own mental space and formed by judgments of whether they are true or not, the values we give to things in the outside world, and the appropriateness of what we plan to do. ^[35]

Our intentional actions come about because of our judgments of the various reasons we might have for acting. Our intentional actions come about because of our judgments of the various reasons we might have for acting. We act in the ways we do, because we believe, because we have judged, it best to act in that way

Desire [orexis/ ὄρεξις] and Aversion [ekklesis/ ἔκκλισις]

These apparently familiar words loosely map onto liking and disliking but have precise technical meanings. Desire and aversion within Stoicism come as a pair. They mean respectively moving towards and moving away from something. Desire is stretching towards what is considered good, and aversion is a shrinking away from something deemed bad or harmful: tending towards things or kinds of things perceived to be worth having but does not lead to the act of getting them. It is the background field of beliefs that gives rise to our impulses ^[36]

Motivation or Inclination/Impulse [hormé/ὁρμή]

Hormé points at the beginning or start of motion, the foundation of action, a term that always points at an action in animals or humans. Impulse is the first movement of any creature, of a baby animal towards its mother, to preserve itself, to avoid harm, and to seek benefit that is appropriate in any given way in any given moment.^[37]

However, hormé goes beyond instinct in humans, where action arises from deep general beliefs, which is what Desire is. They are conclusions that are developed through linguistic reasoning. ^[38]
There is an opposite to hormé, which is aphormé [ἀφορμή], which can be translated as repulsion or disinclination, simply action directed away from something. ^[39] Desire [orexis] and impulse[hormé] are closely related: desire aims to identify our goals, and hormé takes us to them.

• Desire [orexis] is background dispositional belief aiming us at what we believe to be good in general but will not result in action
  • I like apples,
  • I believe they are good.
• Aversion [ekkleisis] is the opposite, pointing away from what we judge as bad.
  • I don’t like apples with worms in
  •  I believe they are bad.
• Impulse [hormé] is our action guided judgments towards selecting a particular instance of that perceived good at any moment.
  • I’m going to eat that particular apple,
  • I think that is the right thing to do.
• Aphormé is the opposite of hormé, action away from something judged to be bad
  • I am going to avoid eating the apple with a worm-shaped hole in it.
  • I think that is the right thing to do.

A quick and simple way of looking at it is that:

• Desire is underlying preference: I like apples
• Impulse is decision entailing action: I will take that apple.

They are all value judgments and up to us, arrived at through reflection, thinking about values, so our task is to make the best judgments possible. And we do this through thinking about our thinking.

Some things are up to us and some are not. Up to us are judgment, impulse, desire, aversion—in short, whatever is our own doing.

This would be more easily understood written like this.

What we do is judgment [impulse, desire, aversion]

All those are impressions, and all carry a judgment and include all of our emotions and all our intentional ethical behavior. It is Socratic critical self examination. And doing this well, is to live well.  

An examined life is the only life worth living

And no distinction is made between this kind of reasoning and our ethical reasoning. It applies to all of our actions It is how we navigate the world and how we behave correctly with regard to others

A thief will steal because they think having certain things is good to have, and that in a particular circumstance, it is appropriate to take possession of them. Someone who does not steal does not think that taking possession of the property of others is appropriate, even if they would value having them.

And the same thinking applies to emotions as judgments. Negative emotions or passions [pathe], such as fear, hatred, and anger, are caused by false evaluations and false expectations. To not get what you believe to be good, desire, or to get what you believe to be bad, aversion

Remember that desire holds out the prospect of getting what you desire, and aversion the prospect of not experiencing what you want to avoid, and that the person who fails in his desire suffers disappointment, while the one who experiences what he wants to avoid suffers misfortune.

Enchiridion 2 ^[40]

And it is not just about emotions around the possession of what the Stoics call externals, or indifferents, but of significant life events, like the prospect of it ending.

“People are troubled not by things but by their judgments about things. Death, for example, isn’t frightening, or else Socrates would have thought it so. No, what frightens people is their judgment about death, that it’s something to fear. So whenever we’re obstructed or troubled or distressed, let’s blame no one but ourselves—that is, our judgments.”

Enchiridion 5 ^[41]

To deal with this, Epictetus laid out a specific education program to train our judgments. This program addressed our fundamental beliefs about what is or is not of value and the actions that stem from our judgments based on these beliefs. And most importantly, the conclusion of the thinking process that pulls the trigger that leads to our actions, which is referred to as assent.

There are three domains in which a person must be trained if he’s to become truly good. The first is the domain of desires and aversions, and the upshot of the training is that he never fails to get what he desires and never experiences what he wants to avoid.

The second is the domain of inclination and disinclination, and in general of appropriate behavior, and the upshot of the training is that he acts in an orderly and well-reasoned manner, rather than being careless.

The third is the domain of immunity to error and rash judgment, and in general the domain of assent.

Epictetus, Discourses 3.2.1-3

So these are the content of the three disciplines and points at what is ours and what our work is, both in terms of our own functioning and the task before us.

• Yes, this is worth pursuing or avoiding.
• Yes, this is the right thing to do to achieve that.
• Yes, I have thought this through and checked it for coherence and truth.

And we see the same thing said clearly, not too kindly, using the term work, ergon, or function.

Look for progress where your work (ergon) is, you pitiful creature. Where is your work (ergon)? In desire and aversion, so as not to be disappointed or to encounter what you want to avoid; in inclination and disinclination, to avoid going wrong (morally), in the application of assent and suspension of judgment, to avoid being deceived

Discourse 1.4.11 [42]

So everything swings on the only thing that is ours: our core functions of judgment of our impressions, and this is the work we must do not to live a deluded unhappy life. So we can rephrase our maxim again.

Up to us are judgment, impulse, desire, aversion—in short, whatever is our own doing

What is ours is the function of our mind and the work it does.

Having decoded the problematic phrase we started with, we can fill in some detail. There is a longer explanation of what is eph’hemin in the first of the Discourses of Epictetus, conveniently entitled On what is and is not eph’hemin

Part 2 What are we talking about?

Although the more well-known work, the Enchiridion, is a very condensed summary of a more extensive work, the Discourses, the latter gives more detail to the points raised in the Enchiridion, which cannot be understood without it.

In the very first chapter of the Discourses, Epictetus discusses various mental functions that we have and picks out what we are already familiar with, as being what he calls the “ruling faculty,” which he refers to by many names.

• the faculty of judgment
• the faculty of making use of impressions
• the faculty of inclination and disinclination, of desire and aversion,
• The ruling faculty of reason as that which analyses both itself and all the other faculties.

We are already familiar with the first three; what is new is the faculty of reason, as the faculty of critical self-analysis.

To summarize the whole text in brief, in considering the faculties or abilities of mind in general, the Discourse opens with Epictetus observing that our mental abilities or skills do not generally carry with them the ability to judge whether they should be engaged in or not.

Your ability to write will not tell if you should write or not, nor what to write; your ability to play an instrument will not tell you when and where to play.

Generally speaking, you’ll find no faculty that has the ability to examine itself, and therefore none that has the ability to assess itself and see whether or not it’s acceptable.

How far can grammar examine? Only writing decisions. Musicology? Choosing songs only. Does either contemplate itself? No. Grammar will help you express yourself when writing to a friend, but it won’t tell you if you should. Musicology and tunes won’t tell you whether to sing and play the lyre now or wait.

Discourse 1.1.1-3

The exception to these faculties or abilities is the faculty of reason, which is linguistic thinking, our internal dialogue, which allows us to converse with ourselves and make value judgments about the appropriateness of what we think we should do.

Shall I write, shall I speak? What shall I say? When shall I say it? And the faculty of reason can look back at the judgments it has made and judge those judgments.

“I think it is a good idea to say this now, but is it a good idea? Why do I think it is a good idea? What would be a better idea?” These are all impressions; the rational faculty forms them, and their appropriateness, or proper application, is reflected upon and decided upon by the rational faculty.

It is an idea of reflection, reflexivity, recursion, something acting upon itself. There is no understating the importance of understanding that what is analyzed is the same as the analyzer. ^[43]

Self-analysis can be counter-intuitive to many, but it is like looking at yourself: the thing looking and the thing being looked at are one and the same, but this applies to thinking. You are thinking about your thinking. Metacognition is a modern term for it.

knowledge about one’s own thoughts and cognitive processes as well as the cognitive regulation involved in directing one’s learning ^[44]

A non-reflective person would simply have the idea of playing the trumpet and play it, or just speak or act completely spontaneously with no thought to the values involved in the context. A rational, reflective person thinks about their thinking and comes to a judgment of what is appropriate given the circumstances.

The following is possibly the most crucial phrase in the whole of the Discourses.

Which faculty, then, will give you this information? The one that examines both itself and everything else. And which is that? The faculty of reason, because it’s the only one we’ve been granted that considers both itself—what it is, what it’s capable of, what value it comes with—and all the other faculties.

Discourse 1.1.4

It is not reason as in cold calculation; it is considering values and determining the right thing to do, the right way to behave, for the right reasons, in the right circumstances.   When and where you decide to write, speak, or act in any way involves placing values on things, whether gold or the right thing said or done at the right time.

What else is it that tells you that gold is beautiful? It isn’t the gold itself. It must be the faculty that makes use of impressions. Is there anything else that decides about musicology, grammar, and all the other faculties, that assesses their uses and shows when it’s the right time for them? No, there’s not.

Discourse 1.1.5-6

The rational faculty is declared to be the master or ruling faculty. Its activity is the correct use of impressions, encompassing all our perceptions, beliefs, and judgments.

Epictetus is so impressed by this that he describes it as a divine gift, although not magical, given to us by the gods and part of Zeus himself, and we see the term eph’hemin explicitly used.

“Fittingly, then, the only faculty the gods made up to us [eph’hemin] was the best of them all, the master faculty—that is, the right use of impressions—but they made none of the others up to us [eph’hemin].

Discourse 1.1.7

But what does Zeus say?  .. I’ve given you a portion of myself, this faculty of inclination and disinclination, of desire and aversion, or, to generalize, the faculty of making use of impressions. If you care for it and place what’s yours in it, you’ll never be impeded, never obstructed, you won’t complain, you won’t find fault, and you won’t court anyone’s favor.

Discourse 1.1.12

The correct use of impressions is what is eph’hemin, and the correct use of impressions is the function of the faculty of inclination and disinclination, desire, and aversion.

The message is that if we take care of our rational faculty and make proper use of our own judgments, we will never go wrong in our lives and never be forced to do anything we don’t want to do. If we place our priorities in things that are not ours, we set ourselves up for failure.

As we have already worked out, what is not ours is everything that is not our own judgments. The Enchiridion lists our body and property, our reputations, and our official positions, and below relatives, friends, children, and slaves (!) are added. (the last opens a huge discussion, but it is worth mentioning that Epictetus was formerly a slave himself)

But now, although it’s possible for us to make just one thing the object of our care and devotion, we prefer to care for and be attached to many things—body, possessions, brother, friend, child, slave.

Discourse 1.1.14

We are then given various examples of the sailing of our boat being delayed, sentenced to death, or sent into exile. In each case, the message is the same; we willingly accept what is not ours and focus on what is ours and what we are capable of doing. Which is to make the right judgments about what we should or should not do and accept everything else that happens as given.

So what must we do? Make the best of what’s up to us and take everything else as it comes

Discourse 1.1.17

So what resources do we need to have at hand for circumstances like these? Just the knowledge of what is and isn’t mine, and of what is and isn’t possible for me

 I am condemned to death. Do I have to die moaning and groaning as well? To incarceration. Do I have to complain about it?

 ‘Divulge your secrets.’

I refuse, because that’s something that’s up to me [ep emoi/mine].

‘I’ll clap you in irons.’

What are you talking about, man? Me? You’ll shackle my leg, but not even Zeus can conquer my will [prohairesis].

Discourse 1.1.21-23

Here we get yet one more term to describe our faculty of judgment. Prohairesis translated here as volition. ^[45] Other terms used are Will, Moral Purpose, or Sphere of Choice. It is our ability to make purposeful, ethical choices, ideally based on true beliefs about the world.

Things are good, bad, or indifferent.

The virtues and everything in which the virtues play a part are good, and their opposites are bad.

Epictetus D 2.14.9  

Where does the good lie?

In prohairesis Where does the bad lie?

In prohairesis

Epictetus D 2.16.1  

It is ours, unlike our poor legs, heads, and bodies, which are not eph’hemin, they can be taken away from us, but if so, we remain intact as an ethical, rational person. You can chain up Epictetus’s leg and cut off his head, but you have done no harm to him as a person. His life and his leg are not his.

I am condemned to death. If it happens straightaway, I die. If, after a short delay, I eat first, since the time has come for it, and then I’ll die later. How? As is proper for someone who’s giving back what was not their own

Discourse 1.1.32

Essentially prohairesis is who we are in terms of our character, which is to say, our goals, desires, aversions, and motivations. It is who we are, our self.

For you yourself are neither flesh nor hair, but prohairesis and if you render that beautiful, then you yourself will be beautiful.

Discourse 3.1.40

It is very Stoic to think that what is good only has to do with our minds and moral choices. This is called moral intellectualism; that we do everything we do because we think that is the best to do. Anything outside of our judgments of what is best to do or not do, which is to say our ethical decisions, is indifferent, neither good nor bad.

These are the ideas to which people who take up philosophy should apply themselves, which they should write about every day, and in which they should train themselves:

Discourse 1.1.25

That’s what it’s like to have trained oneself properly, to have made desire immune to impediment and aversion immune to encountering what it wants to avoid

Discourse 1.1.31

For Epictetus, the result of developing prohairesis, or knowing the value and use of things, is a good life, a well-lived life in which ignorance and delusion never get in the way, and you don’t have trouble working out your place in the world. Knowing what you should do and what you should avoid so that you’re able to live in harmony with the world, other people, and yourself:

So to wind up, we have clarified what is up to us, or ours:

• Functions of mind
• The faculty of judgment
• The faculty of making use of impressions
• The faculty of inclination and disinclination, of desire and aversion
• The ruling faculty of reason as that which analyses both itself and all the other faculties.
• Prohairesis; our moral character or self,
• Our work and proper function. Virtue.

Part 3 Close

So to close this exercise and to close the loop: the only thing that is ours is the faculty of reason. It’s the only faculty we have that considers itself -what it is, what it’s capable of, what it is worth, and the worth and value of everything else. So returning to the Enchiridion, we can give a fair summary of the first chapter above:

1.1 Some things in the world are up to us, while others are not. Up to us are our faculties of judgment, motivation, desire, and aversion in short, everything that is our own doing.

1.2 Not up to us are our body and property, our reputations, and our official positions in short, everything that is not our own doing.

1.3 Moreover, the things up to us are naturally free, unimpeded, and unconstrained, while the things not up to us are powerless, servile, impeded, and not our own.

1.4 Keep this in mind then: if you think things naturally servile are free and that things not our own are ours, you will be frustrated, pained, and troubled, and you will find fault with gods and men.

1.5 But if you think you own only what is yours and that you do not own what is not yours, as you really don’t, no one will ever put pressure on you, no one will impede you, you will not reproach anyone, you will not blame anyone, you will not do a single thing reluctantly, no one will harm you, you will have no enemy, because nothing harmful will happen to you.

1.6 Keep in mind, then, that you have to be highly motivated if you want to achieve such great goals. You will have to forego some things completely and postpone others for the present.

1.7 But if you want both at the same time the things that are really yours plus prominence and wealth in addition you will probably not get even the latter because of wanting the former as well, and you certainly will not get the former, which are the only way to secure freedom and happiness.

1.8 Right now, then, make it your habit to tell every jarring thought or impression: “you are just an appearance and not what you appear to be.” ^[13]

1.9 Next, examine it and test it by these rules that you have. First and foremost: does it involve the things up to us, or the things not up to us? And if it involves one of the things not up to us, have the following response to hand: “not my business.”

AA Long: How to Be Free

• Prohairesis, our ability to rationally reflect upon our own judgments about what is to be pursued or avoided is the only thing that is ours, and the only thing of true value.
• What is not ours, external things, only have value if we avoid or pursue them for the right reasons, in the right way.
• Anything can interfere with getting or avoiding anything that is not freely ours, so to count on them will lead to disappointment.
• If we only count on working on what is ours, avoiding bad judgments, and pursuing good judgments about what we should do, we will be truly free from disappointment .
• To rationally reflect upon our own judgments about what is to be pursued or avoided alone is ours, our business, our work, our task.
• This is prohairesis, This is virtue. This is ours.
   

So what is education?

Learning to apply your natural preconceptions to particular instances in accord with nature, and also gaining the ability to recognize that some things are ours and some aren’t. 

What is ours is prohairesis and everything that is the work of prohairesis;
not ours are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, the country of our birth, and in short, all the people with whom we associate.

So where will we find what’s good for us? To what should we apply the concept?

To what is ours

Discourse 1.22.10 ^[46]

For you yourself are neither flesh nor hair, but prohairesis and if you render that beautiful, then you yourself will be beautiful.

Discourse 3.1.40

The essence of the good is a certain disposition of our choice [prohairesis], and that of the bad likewise. What are externals, then? Materials for our prohairesis, which attains its own good or ill through the way in which it deals with them.

Discourse 1.29.1-2

And just so we do not forget the point of the whole exercise:

So what is the job of a citizen? Never to act in his own interest and never to think about any matter as if he were an isolated entity but to behave as a hand or foot would if it had reason and was able to understand the natural order of things: it would never have inclinations or desires except by reference to the whole

Discourse 2.10.4

I recommend looking at the fuller references in the end notes [jd]

Bibliography

• Carter, E. Discourses Of Epictetus Dent And Sons, London; 1910
• Dobbin, R. Epictetus; Discourses and Selected Writings  Penguin Classics; 2008
• Hard, R. Epictetus Discourses, Fragments, Handbook OUP Oxford; 2014
• Long AA: How to Be Free: An Ancient Guide to the Stoic Life: Encheiridion and Selections from Discourses. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2018.
• Long, G.: Enchiridion [Dover Thrift Editions] Dover Publication; 2004
• Oldfather, W. A: Epictetus The Discourses As Reported By Arrian, The Manual, And Fragments : London William Heinemann Ltd;1952
• Rolleston, T.W.H : The Encheiridion of Epictetus, Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co London; 1881
• Waterfield, R: The Complete Works: Handbook, Discourses, and Fragments : University of Chicago Press; 2022

• Bobzien, S: Stoic Conceptions Of Freedom And Their Relation To Ethics: Bulletin Of The Institute Of Classical Studies. Supplementno. 68, Aristotle And After (1997), Pp. 71-89 (19 Pages) Oxford University Press: 1997
• Bobzien, S: Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: Oxford University Press (2001)
• Bobzien: Epictetus And That Which Depends On Us. Clarendon Press • Oxford 1998 p333
• Destrée, Pierre ; Salles, R. & Zingano, Marco Antonio De (eds.) (2014). Up to Us: Studies on Causality and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy. Academia Verlag.
• Harven, V: Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind Chapter 11, History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine, ed. John Sisko Vol. 1 Acumen Publishing 2018
• Klein, J.: Desire and Impulse in Epictetus and the Older Stoics” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 103, no. 2, 2021, pp. 221-251. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2017-0113
• Long AA: Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life: Clarendon Press 2004
• Long AA: From Epicurus to Epictetus, Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy: Clarendon Press 2006
• Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N.. The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Cambridge University Press; 1987
• Long Stoic Studies, AA: Representation and The Self Cambridge University Press [15 Aug. 1996] p270
• Sellars J. The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy Bloomsbury Publishing 2013
• Tremblay, M. Theory And Training In Epictetus’ Program Of Moral Education: PHD thesis Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada [May, 2021]
• Ramelli, Ilaria: Hierocles the Stoic: Elements Of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts Brill: 2009
• Shogry, S.:  What do our impressions say? De Gruyter June 16, 2018
• Stephens W.O Stoic Ethics: Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom, Bloomsbury Publishing 2007

Endnotes

---

[1] AA Long How to be Free.  Princeton University Press 2018

[2] Discourse 1.22.10 (I have used my own phrasing for this English translation)
Some thing are ours and some are not. What is ours is prohairesis and everything that is prohairesis’s function
ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα,

[9] “So what is education? Learning to apply your natural preconceptions to particular instances in accord with nature, [10] and also gaining the ability to recognize that some things are up to us and some aren’t.  Up to us are will and everything that results from will; not up to us are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, the country of our birth, and in short, all the people with whom we associate. [11] So where will we find what’s good for us? To what should we apply the concept? To what’s up to us.” Trans Waterfield
[9] τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, [10] ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν: ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, κτήσεις, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοὶ, τέκνα, πατρίς, ἁπλῶς οἱ κοινωνοί.

Discourse 1.22.10

^[3] Elizabeth Carter Discourses Of Epictetus Dent And Sons, London  1910

^[4] Thomas William Hazen Rolleston London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co London 1881

^[5] George Long: Enchiridion [Dover Thrift Editions] Dover Publications, 2004

[6] Oldfather, W. A: Epictetus The Discourses As Reported By Arrian, The Manual, And Fragments : London William Heinemann Ltd 1952

[7] Robert Dobbin Epictetus; Discourses and Selected Writings  Penguin Classics; 2008

[8] Robin Hard; ‎ Epictetus Discourses, Fragments, Handbook OUP Oxford; 2014

[9] AA Long How to be Free.  Princeton University Press [18 Sept. 2018

[10] Robin Waterfield: The Complete Works: Handbook, Discourses, and Fragments : University of Chicago Press 2022

[11] AA Long: Ibid

[12] Eph’hemin is a dative construction indicating possession
https://ancientgreek.pressbooks.com/chapter/25/
https://daedalus.umkc.edu/FirstGreekBook/JWW_FGB47.html

[13] I have inserted the translation “You’re an impression, and not at all what you appear to be.” by Waterfield to replace Long’s “not the real thing”
εὐθὺς οὖν πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ τραχείᾳ μελέτα ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι ‘φαντασία εἶ καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον.’
A word for word translation might be : “You are an appearance, and not absolutely the thing appearing.’

[14] ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί

Enchiridion 18
But every omen is propitious for me if I so wish, because, whatever the outcome, it’s up to me to benefit from it Trans Waterfield
ἐμοὶ δὲ πάντα αἴσια σημαίνεται, ἐὰν ἐγὼ θέλω: ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν τούτων ἀποβαίνῃ, ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί ἐστιν ὠφεληθῆναι ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.’

Discourse 1.1.23
Divulge your secrets.’ I refuse, because that’s something that’s up to me. Trans Waterfield
ἰπὲ τὰ ἀπόρρητα.’ οὐ λέγω: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί ἐστιν. 

[15] ἐμὸν

Discourse 1.1.21
So what resources do we need to have at hand for circumstances like these? Just the knowledge of what is and isn’t mine, and of what is and isn’t possible for me.
 ‘τί οὖν δεῖ πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις;’ τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τί ἐμὸν καὶ τί οὐκ ἐμὸν καὶ τί μοι ἔξεστιν καὶ τί μοι οὐκ ἔξεστιν;

[16] ἐστι σόν
Enchiridion 6
Don’t take pride in any distinction that isn’t your own. If a horse were proudly to say ‘I’m beautiful,’ that would be acceptable. But when you proudly say, ‘I own a beautiful horse,’ you must realize that what you’re taking pride in is a horse’s good quality. So what is yours? Making use of impressions. And so, when you’re in accord with nature in the use you make of impressions, that can be a source of pride, because then you’ll be taking pride in something good that’s yours. Trans Waterfield
 ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ἐπαρθῇς ἀλλοτρίῳ προτερήματι. εἰ ὁ ἵππος ἐπαιρόμενος ἔλεγεν ὅτι ‘καλός εἰμι,’ οἰστὸν ἂν ἦν: σὺ δέ, ὅταν λέγῃς ἐπαιρόμενος ὅτι ‘ἵππον καλὸν ἔχω,’ ἴσθι, ὅτι ἐπὶ ἵππου ἀγαθῷ ἐπαίρῃ. τί οὖν ἐστι σόν; χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ὥσθ᾽, ὅταν ἐν χρήσει φαντασιῶν κατὰ φύσιν σχῇς, τηνικαῦτα ἐπάρθητι: τότε γὰρ ἐπὶ σῷ τινι ἀγαθῷ ἐπαρθήσῃ.

[17] ἐπὶ σοί
Enchiridon 2.11
Remember that desire holds out the prospect of getting what you desire, and aversion the prospect of not experiencing what you want to avoid, and that the person who fails in his desire suffers disappointment, while the one who experiences what he wants to avoid suffers misfortune. So if you try to avoid only things that are contrary to nature among the things that are up to you, you’ll meet with none of the things you want to avoid, while if you try to avoid illness or death or poverty, you’ll be miserable
μέμνησο, ὅτι ὀρέξεως ἐπαγγελία ἐπιτυχία, οὗ ὀρέγῃ, ἐκκλίσεως ἐπαγγελία τὸ μὴ περιπεσεῖν ἐκείνῳ, ὃ ἐκκλίνεται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐν ὀρέξει ἀποτυγχάνων ἀτυχής, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἐκκλίσει περιπίπτων δυστυχής. ἂν μὲν οὖν μόνα ἐκκλίνῃς τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐπὶ σοί, οὐδενί, ὧν ἐκκλίνεις, περιπεσῇ: νόσον δ᾽ ἂν ἐκκλίνῃς ἢ θάνατον ἢ πενίαν, δυστυχήσεις.

Discourse 1.12.32
Shouldn’t you rather give thanks to the gods for having allowed you to be beyond the reach of everything they made not up to you [within you/epi soi]and for making you accountable only for things that are up to you? [within you/epi soi] Trans Waterfield
οὐ μᾶλλον εὐχαριστεῖς τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι σε ἐπάνω τούτων ἀφῆκαν ὅσα μηδ᾽ ἐποίησαν ἐπὶ σοί, μόνον δ᾽ ὑπεύθυνον ἀπέφηναν τῶν ἐπὶ σοί; γονέων ἕνεκα ἀνυπεύθυνον ἀφῆκαν:

[18] σὸν εἶναι

Enchiridion 1.3
So remember this: if you regard things that are naturally enslaved as free, if you regard things that are not yours as yours, you’ll be obstructed, dejected, and troubled, and you’ll blame both gods and men.
But if you regard as yours only what is yours, and as not yours only what is not yours, which is the way things are in reality, no one will ever constrain you, no one will impede you, you’ll blame no one, you’ll reproach no one, you’ll never act reluctantly, no one will harm you, and you’ll have no enemies, because you’ll never suffer harm. Trans Waterfield
ὅτι, ἐὰν τὰ φύσει δοῦλα ἐλεύθερα οἰηθῇς καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἴδια, ἐμποδισθήσῃ, πενθήσεις, ταραχθήσῃ, μέμψῃ καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σὸν μόνον οἰηθῇς σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλότριον, οὐδείς σε ἀναγκάσει οὐδέποτε, οὐδείς σε κωλύσει, οὐ μέμψῃ οὐδένα, οὐκ ἐγκαλέσεις τινί, ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἕν, οὐδείς σε βλάψει, ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ἕξεις, οὐδὲ γὰρ βλαβερόν τι πείσῃ.

[19] τὸ σὸν/ to son

Enchiridion 1.3
So remember this: if you regard things that are naturally enslaved as free, if you regard things that are not yours as yours, you’ll be obstructed, dejected, and troubled, and you’ll blame both gods and men. But if you regard as yours only what is yours, and as not yours only what is not yours, which is the way things are in reality, no one will ever constrain you, no one will impede you, you’ll blame no one, you’ll reproach no one, you’ll never act reluctantly, no one will harm you, and you’ll have no enemies, because you’ll never suffer harm. Trans Waterfield
ὅτι, ἐὰν τὰ φύσει δοῦλα ἐλεύθερα οἰηθῇς καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἴδια, ἐμποδισθήσῃ, πενθήσεις, ταραχθήσῃ, μέμψῃ καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σὸν μόνον οἰηθῇς σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλότριον, οὐδείς σε ἀναγκάσει οὐδέποτε, οὐδείς σε κωλύσει, οὐ μέμψῃ οὐδένα, οὐκ ἐγκαλέσεις τινί, ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἕν, οὐδείς σε βλάψει, ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ἕξεις, οὐδὲ γὰρ βλαβερόν τι πείσῃ.

Discourse 1.2.21
‘But if you speak, I’ll have you killed.’ ‘Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You do your job and I’ll do mine. Yours is to put me to death and mine to die fearlessly. Yours is to send me into exile and mine to leave without grieving. Trans Waterfield
[21] ‘πότε οὖν σοι εἶπον, ὅτι ἀθάνατός εἰμι; καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ποιήσεις κἀγὼ τὸ ἐμόν. σόν ἐστιν ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐμὸν ἀποθανεῖν μὴ τρέμοντα: σὸν φυγαδεῦσαι, ἐμὸν ἐξελθεῖν μὴ λυπούμενον.’

[20]  ἔργα/erga/function/work  

Discourse Discourse 4.11.6-8

Now, the soul’s functions are inclination and disinclination, desire and aversion, aptitude, purposiveness, and assent. [7] So what is it that makes the soul dirty and unclean in its performance of these functions? When it judges badly, that’s all. 8] It follows that uncleanliness of the soul consists in bad judgments, what it takes to clean it is the introduction of the right kind of judgments, and a clean soul is one that has the right kind of judgments. Only such a soul is immune to confusion and contamination in the performance of its functions. Trans Waterfield
 ἔργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι, ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι. τί ποτ᾽ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ῥυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ μοχθηρὰ κρίματα αὐτῆς 8] ὥστε ψυχῆς μὲν ἀκαθαρσία δόγματα πονηρά, κάθαρσις δ᾽ ἐμποίησις οἵων δεῖ δογμάτων. καθαρὰ δ᾽ ἡ ἔχουσα οἷα δεῖ δόγματα: μόνη γὰρ αὕτη ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς αὑτῆς ἀσύγχυτος καὶ ἀμόλυντος.

[21]  ἡμέτερα ἔργα/hemetera erga/our own doing

Enchiridion 1
Some things are up to us and some are not. Up to us are judgment, inclination, desire, aversion—in short, whatever is our own doing. Trans Long
τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα

[22] ἐμὸν ἔργον/emoi ergon/my job

Discourse 4.5.34
[34] That’s my job, and neither tyrant nor master can impede me against my will, nor can a crowd, though I’m just one man, nor can a stronger person, though I’m weaker, because will has been given to each of us by God to be unimpeded Trans Waterfield
[34] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε τύραννος κωλύσει με θέλοντα οὔτε δεσπότης οὔτε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν ἕνα οὔθ᾽ ὁ ἰσχυρότερος τὸν ἀσθενέστερον: τοῦτο γὰρ ἀκώλυτον δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκάστῳ.

Discourse 2.5.2-3
How, then, is one to retain one’s self-possession and peace of mind, and at the same time be careful rather than purposeless or negligent? If one imitates people playing a board game. The counters are indifferent and the dice are indifferent: how do I know which way they’ll fall? But to use the throw carefully and skillfully, that’s my job. Trans Waterfield
πῶς οὖν τηρήσῃ τις ἅμα μὲν τὸ εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἀτάραχον, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς καὶ μὴ εἰκαῖον μηδ᾽ ἐπισεσυρμένον; [3] ἂν μιμῆται τοὺς κυβεύοντας. αἱ ψῆφοι ἀδιάφοροι, οἱ κύβοι ἀδιάφοροι: πόθεν οἶδα, τί μέλλει πίπτειν; τῷ πεσόντι δ᾽ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν.

[23] Discourse 2.1.12
If instead someone applies caution to the sphere of will [prohairesis] and the works of will [prohairesis] , no sooner does he wish to act cautiously than, hard on its heels, he gains the power of aversion. But if he applies caution to the sphere of things that aren’t up to us and aren’t subject to will, he’s employing aversion on things that are not up to him, and so he’s bound to be frightened, unsettled, and troubled Trans Waterfield
ἂν γάρ τις ἐκεῖ μεταθῇ τὸ εὐλαβές, ὅπου προαίρεσις καὶ ἔργα προαιρέσεως, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ θέλειν εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ κειμένην ἕξει τὴν ἔκκλισιν: ἂν δ᾽ ὅπου τὰ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀπροαίρετα, πρὸς τὰ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλοις ὄντα τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἔχων ἀναγκαίως φοβήσεται, ἀκαταστατήσει, ταραχθήσεται

[24] Discourses 2.5.6-7
What, then, are we to use these externals in a careless fashion? Not at all, for that is again bad for our faculty of choice [prohairesis], and thus contrary to Nature. Rather, they should be used with care, because their use is not a matter of indifference, and at the same time with composure and calmness of mind, because the material being used is indifferent.Trans Waterfield

[25] Discourse 2.10.4
So what is the job of a citizen? Never to act in his own interest and never to think about any matter as if he were an isolated entity but to behave as a hand or foot would if it had reason and was able to understand the natural order of things: it would never have inclinations or desires except by reference to the whole

[26] He [Zeno] said that the divine permeates all things. The causes of things sometimes depend on us and sometimes do not depend on us that is, some things are up to us while some are not
Epiphanius of Salamis, A Concise, Accurate Account of the Faith of the Catholic and Apostolic Church De Fide 9.38

[27] “The first expression, eph’ hemin, is familiar from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Later it gained general acceptance as the standard way of referring to the kind of human self-determination at issue in the discussions of the compatibility of moral responsibility with determinism Bobzien Susanne: Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility: Essays in Ancient Philosophy Oxford University Press 2021 p 72

 [28] Bobzien: Epictetus And That Which Depends On Us. Clarendon Press • Oxford 1998 p333

^[29] For they [the Stoics] deny that man has the freedom to choose becween opposice actions, and say that it is what comes about through us that is eph’hemin
άναιρούντες γάρ τό έξουσίαν έχειν τόν άνθρωπον τής αίρέσεώς τε καί πράξεως τών αντικειμένων λέγουσιν έφ’ ήμΐν είναι τό γινόμενον [καί] δι’ ημών.
Alexander of Aphrodisias Concerning Fate
Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N.. The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Cambridge University Press. p 389.

[30] Every animal qua animal moves, when it moves, in accordance with impulse—a motion which is brought about by fate through the animal. [6] … They say that the motions brought about by fate through animals are ‘in the power of’ the animals. In terms of necessity their motions are like everything else, since for them too the external causes must, at the time, be present of necessity, with the result that in some such way it is of necessity that they enact their self-propelled motion in accordance with impulse. But because these motions come about through impulse and assent, whereas the motions of those other things come about because of weight, heat or some other cause, they call this motion ‘in the power of’ the animals, but do not call each of those others ‘in the power of’ the stone, or the fire. [7] Such, in brief, is their doctrine concerning that which is in our power.

Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N.. The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Cambridge University Press. [p. 578].

[31] WD Ross Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, Botoche Books 1999 III.v.6, 1113b19-22 ]

[32]
Discourses 2.24.19

If a person doesn’t know who he is, what he was born for, what kind of world this is in which he finds himself, with whom he shares it, what’s good and what’s bad, what’s right and what’s wrong, and if he can’t follow an argument or a proof, doesn’t understand truth and falsehood, and is incapable of telling them apart, none of his desires, aversions, inclinations,or objectives, and none of the occasions when he assents to an impression or withholds assent or suspends judgment, will be in accord with nature. In short, he’ll go around deaf and blind, thinking that he’s somebody when he’s not. Trans Waterfield

Discourses 2.17.26

And what are these? Citizenship, marriage, having children, honoring God, looking after parents—or, to put it succinctly, exercising desire and aversion, inclination and disinclination, as we ought in each case, which is to say, in accord with our natures. Trans Waterfield
Discourse 3.7.34

Make us want to be like you, as Socrates did. He was a true ruler of people, because he got people to look up to him to see how to manage their desires, aversions, inclinations, and disinclinations. Trans Waterfield

Discourse 3.22,26

Why did you even come here in the first place? Your desire wasn’t threatened at all, was it, or your aversion, or your inclination, or your disinclination? Trans Waterfield

Discourse 3.12.13

“After desire and aversion, the second domain is that of inclination and disinclination. The aim here is to get them to be obedient to reason, to operate at suitable times and places, and to be commensurate in all other such respects. Trans Waterfield

[33] Impressions
Simon Shogry What do our impressions say? De Gruyter June 16, 2018
https://simonshogry.com/research/

[34]

Discourse 2.6 21
But I’m also threatened by a belief. Who can make you believe something you don’t wish to believe? So you mean someone else’s? But how can the danger be yours if it’s others’ beliefs that are false?” Trans Waterfield
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει κινδυνεύω.’ τῇ σῇ; πῶς; τίς γάρ σε ἀναγκάσαι δύναται ὑπολαβεῖν τι ὧν οὐ θέλεις; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ; καὶ ποῖός ἐστι κίνδυνος σὸς ἄλλους τὰ ψεύδη ὑπολαβεῖν;

Discourse 1.11.33

In a word, it isn’t death or exile or pain or anything like that that moves us to do or not do something, but our beliefs and our judgments Trans Waterfield
καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν τι ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα.

Discourse 2.9.14

Over the course of many years, you see, we’ve become used to doing the opposite, and the beliefs that we do hold and put to use are the opposite of the correct ones. So if we don’t also put the correct ones to use, all we are is interpreters of others’ views Trans Waterfield
πολλῷ γὰρ χρόνῳ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν εἰθίσμεθα καὶ τὰς ὑπολήψεις τὰς ἐναντίας ταῖς ὀρθαῖς χρηστικὰς ἔχομεν. ἂν οὖν μὴ καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς χρηστικὰς ποιήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐξηγηταὶ ἐσόμεθα ἀλλοτρίων δογμάτων.

Discourse 3.16.9-13
So until your pleasantries become solid beliefs and you’ve acquired some means of keeping yourselves safe, I’d advise you to be cautious when engaging with non-philosophers. Otherwise, whatever you inscribe on your minds in the classroom will melt away, day by day, like wax in the sun. [10] Take yourselves off, then, to somewhere far from the sun, as long as your beliefs are as impermanent as wax. [11] That’s why philosophers advise us even to leave our homelands, because ingrained habits lead us astray and prevent us from making a start on gaining new ones. And that’s also why we feel uncomfortable when acquaintances say, ‘Really? He’s a philosopher? Someone like him?’ [12] Doctors do the same as well when they send people with chronic illnesses off to a different place and a different climate. Trans Waterfield

μέχρις ἂν οὖν παγῶσιν ἐν ὑμῖν αἱ κομψαὶ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δυναμίν τινα περιποιήσησθε πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν, συμβουλεύω ὑμῖν εὐλαβῶς τοῖς ἰδιώταις συγκαταβαίνειν: εἰ δὲ μή, καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ὡς κηρὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ διατακήσεται, ὑμῶν εἴ τινα ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἐγγράφετε. [10] μακρὰν οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου πού ποτε ὑπάγετε, μέχρις ἂν κηρίνας τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἔχητε. [11] διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν πατρίδων συμβουλεύουσιν ἀποχωρεῖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι τὰ παλαιὰ ἔθη περισπᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τινὰ ἄλλου ἐθισμοῦ, οὐδὲ φέρομεν τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας καὶ λέγοντας ‘εἴδ᾽ ὁ δεῖνα φιλοσοφεῖ, ὁ τοῖος καὶ ὁ τοῖος.’ [12] οὕτως καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ τοὺς μακρονοσοῦντας ἐκπέμπουσιν εἰς ἄλλην χώραν καὶ ἄλλον ἀέρα καλῶς ποιοῦντες. [13] καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀντεισαγάγετε ἄλλα ἔθη: πήξατε ὑμῶν τὰς ὑπολήψεις, ἐναθλεῖτε αὐταῖς;

Discourse 4.6 14
So what’s the problem? Perhaps I haven’t eliminated the contrary judgments? Or perhaps my beliefs themselves are untrained and unaccustomed to being confronted by the real world, like pieces of stored armor that are becoming rusty and can’t even fit me anymore? Trans Waterfield
τί οὖν τὸ λεῖπόν μοι ἐστίν; μὴ οὐκ ἐξῄρηται τἀναντία δόγματα; μὴ αὐταὶ αἱ ὑπολήψεις ἀγύμναστοί εἰσιν οὐδ᾽ εἰθισμέναι ἀπαντᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁπλάρια ἀποκείμενα κατίωται καὶ οὐδὲ περιαρμόσαι μοι δύναται;

Enchiridion 31
You should know that the most important aspect of piety toward the gods is having correct beliefs about them: Trans Waterfield
τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν
 καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν τι ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα.

[35] Impressions

Applying the notion to human animals, we may take it as a Stoic datum that my sensing something white, my awareness that what is hurting is my leg, my recollection of someone’s birthday, my current thought of Socrates, and my reflection on the square root of two, are all alike in being representations, appearances of something to me.: If the representational faculty covers all of these mental states, what mental states fall outside its scope? The answer, I believe, is none

AA Long Stoic Studies: Representation and The Self Cambridge University Press [15 Aug. 1996] p270

[36] See Jacob Klein: Desire and impulse in Epictetus and the Older Stoics: De Gruyter November 5, 2020
https://www.colgate.edu/media/2571/download?attachment

[37] Ilaria Ramelli Hierocles The Stoic: Elements Of Ethics, Fragments, And Excerpts: Brill 2009

^[38] [1 ] Of moving things, some have the cause of movement in themselves, while others are moved only from outside. [2 ] The latter comprise things which are transportable, like logs and stones and every material thing which is sustained by tenor alone… [3 ] Animals and plants have the cause of movement in themselves, and so, quite simply, does everything sustained by psyche or soul, which they say also includes metals… [4 ] Some things of this kind, they say, are moved ‘out of’ themselves, and others ‘by’ themselves: the former comprise soulless things, the latter ones which are ensouled. Ensouled things are moved ‘by’ themselves when an impression occurs within them which calls forth an impulse… [5 ] A rational animal, however, in addition to its impressionistic nature, has reason which passes judgment on impressions, rejecting some of these and accepting others, in order that the animal may be guided accordingly

53 A Origen, On principles 3.1.2–3 [SVF 2.988, part]

Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N.. The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary [p. 467]. Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition. P313.

[39] https://logeion.uchicago.edu/%E1%BC%80%CF%86%CE%BF%CF%81%CE%BC%CE%AE

[40] Long AA: How to Be Free:

[41] Long AA: How to Be Free:

[42] Discourse 1.4.11 Waterfield [Modifed to reflect the explict use of the term ergon]
Look for it in things that are up to you, you pitiful creature. Where is that? In desire and aversion, so as not to be disappointed or to encounter what you want to avoid;in inclination and disinclination, to avoid going wrong; in the application of assent and suspension of judgment, to avoid being deceived. Trans Waterfield
11] ἐκεῖ ζήτησον αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρε, ὅπου σου τὸ ἔργον. ποῦ δέ σου τὸ ἔργον; ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, ἵν᾽ ἀναπότευκτος ᾖς καὶ ἀπερίπτωτος, [getting what you want] ἐν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἀφορμαῖς, ἵν᾽ ἀναμάρτητος [morally blameless]ἐν προσθέσει καὶ ἐποχῇ, ἵν᾽ ἀνεξαπάτητος

[43] Discourse 1.17.1-3

Since it’s reason that analyzes and processes everything else, and since it shouldn’t go unanalyzed itself, what is it that analyzes it? [2] The answer, obviously, is that it is either reason itself or something else. Now, this ‘something else’ must either be reason or something superior to reason, but there’s nothing superior to reason. So, if it’s reason, the question again arises: what will analyze it? If it’s a case of reason analyzing itself, the reason we started with can do that. Otherwise, if once more we call on ‘something else’ to do the analyzing, we’ll find ourselves in an unresolvable, interminable regress. Trans Waterfield

[44] Metacognition

https://ctl.columbia.edu/resources-and-technology/resources/metacognition/

[45] Prohairesis

• moral character, will, volition, assent over impressions:
• a rational faculty able to use the impressions and to which all other human faculties are subordinated [e.g., Discourses II.23.6-15; II.23.20-29]
• a faculty capable of using impressions and understanding their use [e.g., Discourses II.8.4-8]
• a self-theoretical faculty able to evaluate all other human faculties [e.g., Discourses I.1.1-13; I.17.1-3; I.20.1-6]
• a faculty impossible to be enslaved [e.g., Discourses II.10.1; I.17.21] and impossible to subordinate [e.g., Discourses II.10.1; I.17.21; IV.1.161]
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohairesis

[46] Discourse 1.22.10 (I have used my own phrasing for this English translation)

Some thing are ours and some are not. What is ours is prohairesis and everything that is prohairesis’s function
ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα,

[9] “So what is education? Learning to apply your natural preconceptions to particular instances in accord with nature, [10] and also gaining the ability to recognize that some things are up to us and some aren’t.  Up to us are will and everything that results from will; not up to us are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, the country of our birth, and in short, all the people with whom we associate. [11] So where will we find what’s good for us? To what should we apply the concept? To what’s up to us.” Trans Waterfield

[9] τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, [10] ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν: ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, κτήσεις, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοὶ, τέκνα, πατρίς, ἁπλῶς οἱ κοινωνοί.